Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
returns, attempts at political cohesion and of course the whole question of war crimes and
exhumations. In many respects these areas will serve to demonstrate the real nature of the
situation following Dayton/Paris and my reaction to these areas of responsibility are based on
my own direct involvement.
Before any examination of the specific areas I have mentioned, it is necessary to examine the
real politik of the situation as it was in the 1990’s and in particular to consider the attitudes
of the ordinary people of the country. It is perhaps well to remember that the vast majority of
people had suffered in some way during the conflict and it must be remembered that feelings
continued to run high. Loyalties also presented a problem and even in such matters as passports,
it was obvious that many Croats and Serbs did not feel any loyalty to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Most Croats held passports issued by the Republic of Croatia and most Serbs held passports
issued by Yugoslavia, i.e. Rump Yugoslavia, by that time effectively consisting of Serbia
and Montenegro. Many people continued to hold out for a further solution to their dilemma
and neither Croats nor Serbs seemed willing to cooperate wholeheartedly with developments
arising out of Dayton/Paris. The Muslim faction also had their own agenda. In short there
remained a great deal of mistrust and indeed fear.
Propaganda often seemed to rule the day and the media of the country continued to one degree
or another to foster the mistrust and fear. In fact, the quality of broadcasting to which people
were subjected was so bad that many admitted to listening to all sides in the hope that they
might thus be able to decide on what the truth actually might be. In time, of course, the level
of propaganda reduced or at least became more subtle and less bitter. Another important
factor was that there was little support for the concept of the return of refugees on the part
of any side and while both Serbs and Croats openly opposed returns into what they saw as
their territory, the Muslims openly supported the concept, but effectively prevented returns;
nobody seemed to really be committed to the return of people from other ethnic groups to
their pre-war homes.
The rationale underlying opposition to returns seemed to be often based again on fear and
mistrust and sometimes this fear and mistrust was not always without foundation and often
when agreement was reached on the return of displaced people, the political actors ensured
that such returns were accompanied by a degree of overt triumph which was calculated to
incite reaction. For the most part neither Croats nor Serbs demonstrated any great wish to
return to areas controlled by Muslims and while Muslims professed to wish to return, those
who did never seemed entirely comfortable with the idea, especially areas which had been
badly effected by the war. Underlying this fear and mistrust was the very real memory of
what had happened during the conflict; the war had been waged with unrelenting brutality by
factions on all sides and many found it difficult to forget this.
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was waged in a way which was reminiscent of the worst
excesses of World War II in the region. It is also well to remember that casualties levels,
while appalling, were less that those claimed by the international media and a realistic figure
is probably in the region of one hundred and twenty thousand fatal casualties and not the two
hundred and fifty thousand claimed; the actual casualty levels may never be determined.
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