Defence Forces Review 2008

Lessons from Kosovo
responsibility for the task; and
• Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of KFOR itself, the
international civil presence, and other international organizations.
• Deterring renewed hostilities.
• Demilitarizing the KLA and other armed Albanian groups.
In effect, Resolution 1244 created an international protectorate. Provision of a secure
environment in which to allow UNMIK perform its multiple tasks was an integral part of
the operation. This assignment fell to the some 40,000 to 50,000 NATO and other troops
deployed as part of KFOR. This was a NATO led international security presence, supposedly
under a unified command structure controlled by the commander of KFOR. While KFOR`s
responsibilities were not as broad as those delegated to the civilian authorities, the mandate to
establish `a secure environment` for refugees and displaced persons in particular, left ample
scope for NATO to resort to whatever means were necessary to achieve this goal. Although
this mandate was intended to apply primarily to Kosovo Albanian refugees, it provided the
basis for KFOR`s significant role in protecting minorities, especially the Kosovo Serbs.
From the outset, there were security problems in Kosovo and accusations that KFOR was not
doing enough. Although it did have initial success in the de-militarization of the KLA and in
preventing a civil war, KFOR`s initial policy was soft on attacks by Albanian extremists on
Serb minorities. The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) found
much of the violence to be ‘following a systematic pattern, organization and careful targeting
of individuals,’ 20 yet the excuse given by United States military and diplomatic staff was that
such attacks were to be expected in the circumstances. 21 Despite the evidence that the KLA were
responsible for much of the violence, UNMIK and KFOR and other internationals continued
to deal with its leaders. This had the unfortunate consequence of reinforcing the impression
that these were key players which, in turn, marginalized more moderate leaders. Part of the
reason for this may have been fear of the KLA. An unforeseen consequence of this policy was
that it enabled extremist elements to carve out control of territory and economic assets and,
therefore, fueled the black market and organized crime. Despite a strongly worded warning
from then Secretary-General of NATO, George Robertson, that NATO troops would not stand
idly by and watch Albanians banish the remaining Serb minority from Kosovo, the assaults
on Serbs and other minorities continued. 22 Human Rights Watch and other organisations have
been very critical of UNMIK`s and KFOR`s failure to protect the minorities and, in particular,
of their inconsistent responses to abuses committed by the majority Albanian population. 23
On 27 October 1999, an Albanian mob of around one thousand attacked a KFOR protected
convoy of Serbs leaving Kosovo. The fact that the Serbs were leaving in the first place is clear
evidence of the failure to provide a secure environment. 24 It is not surprising that there were
calls for KFOR to adopt a more robust interpretation of the mandate and to provide adequate
protection for minorities in all parts of Kosovo. 25
St a n d i n g Op e r a t i n g Pr o c e d u r e s a n d Ru l e s o f En g a g e m e n t (ROE) 26
The problem in Kosovo in March 2004 derived from both the actual ROE and the lack of any
unified policy for their application. The KFOR ROE, as outlined on the soldier’s card, covered
a number of issues (relating to proportionality/minimum force) in addition to outlining when
a soldier can open fire. Permissive ROE allow a military commander to choose the weapon
of choice, unless expressly prohibited, tempered only by proportionality and discretion.
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