Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
these remained untouched. This can only be described as a complete failure by the security
forces to enforce the mandate and provide the required level of security. French, German and
Italian KFOR troops merit special criticism. Career conscious commanders were afraid to
make decisions that could impact negatively on personal future advancement. The fact that
Conventional military tactics are useless in a security environment such as exists in Kosovo
also contributed to the problem. In addition, there is an obvious need for troops and a police
force trained for crowd control and riot situations in order to address the threat to the minority
communities and to the security forces themselves. Moreover, while there was little likelihood
of an invasion prior to the March violence, the failure to adequately respond to it may provide
the Serbian authorities in Belgrade with an excuse and some encouragement to intervene in
the future. The situation was summed up by a senior UNMIK official when he said:
We always knew that Kosovo would not be invaded. KFOR is in
Kosovo to protect from civil violence, civil disturbance and ethnic
violence. They don’t need tanks, but riot gear and shields, and soldiers
trained in dealing with public disorder. If KFOR was not prepared for
such civil disorder, then why the heck not What did they think they
were in Kosovo for 45
Armoured fighting vehicles are almost useless in situations of civil disturbance. As KFOR
does not have sufficient numbers, the very least in can be provided with is adequate equipment
and training for the mission. There is need for a complete review and overhaul of the security
structures currently in place in Kosovo. Conventional armies are reluctant to adopt a role in
quelling riots and similar internal security matters. Nevertheless, this is the primary threat in
Kosovo. As a result, the training, role and mission of KFOR are in need of special attention.
KFOR must also put in place standard operational procedures common to all contingents
and Brigade areas, and national governments must not be allowed to dictate policies that
ultimately undermine the unity and cohesion of KFOR. Relations between KFOR, UNMIK
and the Kosovo Police Service, which were not good in the first place, were ultimately further
undermined. Human Rights Watch called for KFOR ‘to develop a unified command structure
and a common response system to violence in Kosovo, abandoning the decentralised structures
and disparate national doctrines that contributed to the chaos of March 17 and 18’. 46
The final paragraph of the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council for the period
in question thanks KFOR; it also expresses gratitude to NATO for the swift deployment of
additional troops and to UNMIK for commitment and professionalism in carrying out their
duties. 47 While the British deserve credit for the prompt and effective deployment of the Over
the Horizon Forces, such diplomatic language is otherwise farcical in the context of the abject
failure of so many elements to perform their missions and fulfil their responsibilities. A special
internal report more accurately portrays a mission in crisis. Many on the ground in Kosovo
believe that if the rioting had lasted an additional day, the mission would have collapsed. 48 In
fairness, a number of measures have been taken to address the inadequacies evident after the
March riots. Local and minority involvement in the security process is now being facilitated
through Local Crime Prevention Councils established at municipality level, and the Kosovo
Security Advisory Group at the central level.
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