Defence Forces Review 2008

Lessons from Kosovo
Lessons from Kosovo
The Use of Force by UN Mandated Forces
Dr. Ray Murphy
At the time of writing, Ireland has two major commitments overseas, as part of KFOR in
Kosovo and EUFOR in Chad and the Central African Republic (‘CAR’). The security situation
in respect of both missions is volatile and unpredictable. Kosovo has declared independence
and there is significant unrest among the Serb population in the region. 1 As the long awaited
deployment of the EU led mission to Chad/CAR gets underway, much has been made of the
Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the ability of EUFOR to respond ‘robustly’ to any attempt
to prevent it carrying out its mandate. 2 Both the Brahimi Report 3 and the report on events that
led to the fall of Srebrenica 4 question the traditional response of UN forces to the use of force,
each advocating the formulation of a more robust doctrine. This article examines the situation
that led to the outbreak of violence in Kosovo in March 2004 and attempts to draw lessons for
the challenges confronting KFOR today, and by analogy, other relevant UN mandated forces.
The prohibition on the use of force, other than in self-defence, is an essential characteristic
of traditional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and is based on
practical and doctrinal considerations. 5 However, the traditional classification of UN mandated
operations in terms of Chapter VI and VII of the Charter may not have the significance that is
sometimes accorded such classification. The UN Secretary-General’s Report on Threats and
Challenges has referred to the characterisation of peacekeeping missions in terms of ‘Chapter
VI’ or ‘Chapter VII’ operations as somewhat misleading. 6 It acknowledges that there is a
distinction between operations in which a robust use of force is integral to the mission and
those that involve more ‘traditional peacekeeping’ in which there is a reasonable expectation
that force may not be used. However, in peacekeeping cases- as much as peace enforcementit
is now the usual practice to adopt a Chapter VII mandate. An obvious exception is the
2006 mandate for the reconstituted UNIFIL force in south Lebanon. 7 Recent UN military
operations have blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement, and a broad
interpretation of self-defence to include ‘defence of the mission’ may amount to permitting
enforcement of the mandate, even when the operation is authorised under Chapter VI rather
than Chapter VII of the Charter.
The basic rules for the use of force were established during the first stages of the UNEF I
(1956-67) 8 operation and these set a precedent for several later peacekeeping operations. 9
The Secretary-General then envisaged that the basic precept of UN operations would always
include ‘a prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed force’, while at the same time
permitting a response with force to an armed attack, including attempts to make UN troops
withdraw from positions that they occupied under their mandate. 10 After the controversy
surrounding the operation in the Congo (ONUC 1960-64), there was extensive discussion
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