Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
to have been. With the military components, the problem did not arise as much and this
was true in particular because of degree of cooperation which existed between the NATO
led forces and UNOHR (and earlier between NATO and the EU). Cohesion is vital in the
implementation of any peace agreement, but if there exists a situation where individuals or
organisations are unable or unwilling to enter into a cohesive relationship, then problems
inevitably arise to the detriment of everybody. Unfortunately there was quite a noticeable
element of this in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990’s. To an extent, part of the problem
existed within the UN, where there were politically motivated people with views that were
far too inflexible; the same was not true of the EU. A peace process is something that must
be both flexible and pragmatic and those who wish to be effective must be able to recognise
mistakes and more importantly they must be able to recognise the necessity to change their
modus operandi without losing sight of the bigger picture. Unfortunately, the Sarajevo based
non-military UN did not seem to have a compete grasp of the wider picture and sometimes
adopted a somewhat naïve approach that did not help matters. Whistle stop tours are fine in
countries accustomed to peace, but the travelling circus has no real place in an immediate post
war situation, especially when the possibility of renewed conflict exists at all times and where
a pragmatic approach is more often called for to ensure that this does not occur.
While Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the focus of this article, one must remember that it is
impossible to consider Bosnia and Herzegovina in isolation, as it formed part of Yugoslavia.
Prior to the break-up of Yugoslavia the six republics that formed the Federal State had
interacted for quite a long time. It may be feasible to examine other States in isolation, but this
will not always give a clear picture. Yugoslavia was often pulled between centrist Serbia and
Croatia which always aspired towards more autonomy and one must bear in mind that Serbia
and Croatia were the major players in Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina is something of
a melting pot and it seems likely that international actors did not give sufficient credence to
the nationalist aspirations of the ethnic groups within that State. While there is no doubt that
the military aspects of the peace process in the country have worked, the political elements
may only form a patina over the reality. Nationalist aspirations remain strong in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and while I have noted in my various visits to the region in recent years that
while there is an apparent stability, this may not represent the long term reality of the future of
the country. Many would assert that an initial division of the country into three entities, rather
than two might have been the better course. It may be that the international community have
refused to look carefully at the reality and this may prove costly in the interim to long term.
Prior to unrest in Kosovo, it might have been that Bosnia and Herzegovina could have
plodded on for a sufficient time to allow for the inception of real stability. In 2008, however,
we have seen the recognition of a unilaterally declared independence for Kosovo. This
‘independence’, if it gains momentum, will obviously lead to a division of Serbia with all the
potential for subsequent unrest and even the possibility of conflict and almost certainly civil
unrest. Serbia will not relinquish Kosovo easily and it may be argued that there may be a very
good case for not supporting a division of Serbia. Regardless, however, of any arguments
as to the advisability of dividing a European country and accepting the establishment of a
new state that has no real historical basis, there is another potential consequence and this
relates to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that country, both Croats and Bosniacs (Muslims) are
carefully watching for what will happen in Kosovo. From my own knowledge of the country,
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