Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
The Brahimi Report recommendations reflected the realities of modern peacekeeping in the
post cold war era. The majority of missions authorised by the Security Council since the early
nineties have encompassed a vide variety of tasks extending beyond the mere interposition
of lightly armed peacekeepers between warring factions. The organisation’s failure to match
resistance offered undermined its ability to achieve mandates and so damaged its reputation.
There was much to be praised and supported in the report, which contained some 57 explicit
recommendations and more than 100 implicit recommendations. It was a genuine attempt
at identifying the shortcomings of the organisation and it promoted realistic and concrete
proposals to improving the planning, preparation and execution of peace operations. It made
comment and recommendations on six main areas: UN HQ; Conflict Prevention; Leadership
in the Field; Rapid Deployment; Logistics and Peacekeeping. The report was a wake-up call.
It was highly critical of UN members and staff. The report concluded that UN peacekeeping
operations had for too long been used by Member States as a means to be seen as “doing
something” in the face of public outcry, especially when the will to do the right thing had
been lacking, or consensus about what the right thing to do had been missing. It stressed that
sometimes it was preferable not to deploy at all, if the conditions for success simply did not
exist. UN staff had often failed to give hard facts to Member States about the level of resources
required and they failed to insist on the realistic amount of forces and resources required to
properly carry out a peace mission. In addition, UN staff often accepted Security Council
Mandates that were simply unachievable. Brahimi wanted Member States to give clear and
specific mandates, obtain consent to the operation by the parties to conflicts and provide
adequate resources for a mission. He concluded that DPKO needed additional experienced
military and police staff, standby reserves of equipment and forces, as well as added logistics
capacity to reduce deployment delays.
The response to the Brahimi Report on the political level was generally quite positive. While
‘Western’ countries were strongly in favour of the recommended measures others were
lukewarm, particularly with concerns about the potential loss of money for development, the
issue of transitional administration and complex governance issues. The report was adopted
by the Security Council in November 2000 and by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
(C-34) 6 in December of the same year. The Secretary General lost no time in appointing
Deputy Secretary General Frachette to providing an implementation plan of action.
Much progress has been made in implementing the changes recommended. These have resulted
in a major strengthening of the organisation’s planning and staffing capacity, an improvement
in its management systems, the development of a capacity for training and deploying civilian
police, as individuals and units, to the missions. Reporting to the General Assembly in 2006
on the financing of the UN peacekeeping operations 7 the Secretary General outlined a further
reform strategy entitled “Peace Operations 2010” 8 setting out the policies and procedures to
enable DPKO to support peacekeeping over the following decade. The strategy described the
five components deemed essential to a responsive and effective department: the recruitment
and retention of highly qualified personnel, setting down the appropriate doctrine to clearly
define and articulate what it is that UN peacekeeping can and cannot do, establishing
frameworks for interactive partnerships, securing the essential resources to improve operations
and establishing integrated organisational structures at headquarters and in the field.
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