Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
in the event of invasion were to go to their bunkers and stay there. General Callaghan said
that he believed what he called ‘the force of international opinion’ would prevent the Israelis
driving through UN lines. But we didn’t believe this, and nor, we suspected, did General
Callaghan. He knew, just as we did, that if the Israelis chose to smash into Lebanon, the only
international opinion that would count was that of the United States – and America was not
going to oppose Israel.
So the Irish came to spend three years under Israeli occupation, forced to permit Israeli
troops and Shin Bet operatives to pass unhindered through checkpoints whose instructions
still forbade the passage of arms in the UNIFIL area of operations. Because the Hizballahs
resistance activities were concentrated further north on the barren hills around Marrakeh, it fell
to the French battalion, then headquartered there., to confront the worse elements of Yitzhak
Shamir’s so called ‘iron fist’ policy of assault against the villages deemed sympathetic to the
Shi’ite Muslim guerrillas. Just as Irish troops had fought Haddad’s men with their fists at At-
Tiri, the French fought them with their fists in Marrakeh.
My only reflection on this period of 1982-5 is on the wisdom – or lack of it – which permitted
Israeli Shin Bet men to be given UNIFIL permission to pass, armed, through their checkpoints.
It might be said that there was no alternative. Plainclothes Israeli intelligence operatives could
pass through with Israeli military patrols if they wished; indeed they sometimes did so. But
making specific exception for these men was a disturbing precedent. Their activities inside
the area of operations – particularly in Frenchbatt – often involved conflict with the local
populations, undercover arrests and, as we quickly realised, unexplained shootings. Some
of these killings were accompanied by evidence that they were not more than extra-judicial
killings; what might perhaps be described as war crimes.
Should UNIFIL have given these men access to the area of operations Should they have been
given cards by UNIFIL – as they were on several occasions – that gave them this access
Amal were later given similar documents, but this scarcely approximates to the papers that
cleared Israeli general security duties (GSS) men through the UN checkpoints. In this context,
it is worth quoting the words of a Hizbollah member in conversation with an Irish officer only
a few months ago;
“I was in Tibnin when the Israeli general security services came for
me. UNIFIL made no effort to stop me being arrested. The general
security services could come and take me out. They had UNIFIL cards.
They took me through UNIFIL checkpoints, and the UN did not stop
them. This formed my view of UNIFIL.”
If those cards had not been issued, would there be easier relations today between UNIFIL
troops and the Hizballah Since UNIFIL headquarters persist to this day in trying to build up
the bankrupt political prestige of Amal at the expense of Hizballah, perhaps not. But I have not
met an Irish solder who does not believe those cards were a mistake, a dangerous slide away
from UNIFIL’s neutrality. UNIFIL, I believe, should never have given the GSS such access.
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