Defence Forces Review 2008

Lessons from Kosovo
the option of deploying a stronger, more concentrated force when necessary. In contrast, the
French have a reputation for inconsistency. When they decide to respond to situations of
tension or crises, they are generally effective; however, they are often too eager to return to
the status quo, even if premature to do so. They have acted against demonstrators, but they
have failed to halt harassment of minorities by Serbs in northern Mitrovica and have notably
failed to take action against the local ‘bridge watchers’ who act as vigilantes to prevent non-
Serbs returning to former homes or entering the Serb controlled area.
KFORs problems in Mitrovica, of course, extend beyond the French. American forces observe
the classic military doctrine of placing the highest priority on the security of their own force.
They also deploy overwhelming, and occasionally effective, force. However, such tactics are
often inappropriate when a threat is relatively small and involves minor actors. It is also a
blunt instrument with which to deal with civil disturbances and riots. The British contingent,
possibly due to the lessons learned from mistakes in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, appears
to have adopted the best overall approach.
The difference in philosophies has been compounded by command and control problems
which have beset KFOR from the outset in the broadest sense. Resolution 1244 made the
military and civilian components distinct but equal partners in the international community’s
efforts to create a functioning democratic administrative structure in Kosovo. It requires
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as overall head of the civil presence,
to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences
operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner. The responsibility
of KFOR expressly includes supporting as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the
work of the international presence. This is the only guidance on the nature and extent of the
relationship between UNMIK and KFOR. Although established under the auspices of the
UN, it is not a typical UN peace support operation. It is not subject to the Secretary-General
or his representative in Kosovo, and it does not have the command and control structure of
other UN operations. 43 This may have appeared to be a good idea on paper, but the practical
implications for an operation as complex as that in Kosovo were not considered in full. The
language of mutual cooperation between UNMIK and KFOR may read well in Resolution
1244, but the consequences for achieving the overall objective of the mission are still being
felt on the ground. This supposedly symbiotic relationship has not facilitated accomplishing
the mission and created serious challenges for UNMIK and KFOR.
Moreover, even if one were to leave the UNMIK-KFOR dichotomy out of the equation,
different military doctrines, cultures and styles have worked against the attainment of a
cohesive and unified approach to implementing the mandate within KFOR itself. The German
commander of KFOR, General Klaus Reinhardt, expressed his view of this problem rather
bluntly when he said, ‘one of the most important things that I have learnt in Kosovo is that the
man who is KFOR commander, in fact doesn’t have anything to command’. 44
Over the course of the two day period in March 2004, the security forces in Kosovo i.e. KFOR,
UMMIK and the Kosovo Police Service, almost lost control of the province. The rioting and
attacks on the minority community was spontaneous yet organized. In many locations every
single Serb, Roma and Ashkali home was burned, while ethnic Albanian homes alongside
87