Xenophon Paper 2 pdf - ICBSS

separatism. Many regional countries are faced with the same problems. This common
challenge creates sound fundamentals for cooperation. Regardless of suspicions that
Russia tacitly supports rebellious autonomies in Georgia and Moldova, 4 the Kremlin
strongly opposes ‘the Kosovo precedent’ which will encourage secessionist trends in
the region, creating serious problems for Russian leadership.
Third, to ensure uninterrupted and secure energy, trade, civil and military communications
within and throughout the Black Sea and the Straits;
Ankara’s threats in the 1990s to reduce the volume of Russia’s oil-tanker traffic through
the Black Sea straits as well the competition for pipeline routes out of the oil-rich Caspian
sea basin have been seen by Moscow as a challenge to its interests in the region. The
same can be said about Turkey’s threats in 1998 both to Russia and Cyprus to take
unspecified necessary ‘measures’ if Russia’s sale of a defence system to Cyprus goes
through.
The ‘pipeline war’ around Caspian oil was guided by the goal to reduce Russia’s leverage
on Azerbaijan and to decrease Russian tanker traffic through the Black Sea straits. The
signing in Athens of a long-delayed Balkan oil pipeline agreement in March 2007 will
ensure the flow of cheaper Russian crude to the Mediterranean. The pipeline between
the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas and the Greek Aegean Sea port of Alexandroupolis,
estimated to cost about $1 billion, will speed up oil transportation by bypassing the
congested Turkish Bosporus, where tanker delays are costing oil companies nearly $1
billion a year. It will be parallel and complementary to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
Still, the “pipeline war”, being in some sense a consequence of political tensions around
conflicts in the region, will no doubt, in its turn, aggravate political and military
contradictions, driving farther apart Russia, Armenia and Iran on the one side, and the
USA, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Georgia on the other side, thus among other
things splitting deeper the CIS and thwarting Moscow’s efforts at integration on the
post-Soviet space. 5 On the 8 th of March 2007, the presidents of Poland and Ukraine
proposed that an energy summit should be held in May with Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Kazakhstan to discuss alternative energy pipeline routes to Europe.
Fourth, to prevent new dividing lines in the region and expansion of military coalitions
excluding Russia as a full member;
4 Undoubtedly, there are nationalist forces in Russia who would be happy if Russia incorporates these rebellious
territories. Kremlin is still a wall, albeit thin, barring the way to Russian nationalism but that Russian patience with
the Western position on Kosovo is wearing thin too.
5 Arbatov, Alexei (1999), ‘Security: Russia’s Choice’, EPIcenter, pp.160-188.
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