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The process of opening up the dialogue between BSEC and EU officials was inaugurated at a special meeting of the BSEC Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) with representatives of EU institutions and Member States in Brussels on 11 April 2005. That meeting was soon followed by the decision of the BSEC CMFA (Komotini, 23 April 2005) to establish an ad hoc Group of Experts charged with the task of preparing a Working Paper on BSEC-EU interaction. Under the Moldovan Chairmanship-in-Office, the BSEC Council (Chisinau, 28 October 2005) adopted a Declaration on the enhancement of cooperation with the European Union and decided to mandate the Hellenic Republic to proceed with exploratory consultations with relevant EU institutions with a view to the adoption of a declaration by the EU Council on an enhanced BSEC-EU partnership and the eventual formulation of an EU Dimension which would include the coordination of the EU regional policies. In pursuance of its mandate, the MFA of the Hellenic Republic prepared a Working Paper entitled Towards an EU Regional Dimension in the Wider Black Sea Area, which was presented at the meeting of the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) in Brussels (25 January 2006). 25 A second meeting of the BSEC Committee of Senior Officials with representatives of EU institutions and member states took place in Brussels on 11 April 2006. In a significant new development, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council, meeting in Brussels at ministerial level on 14 September 2006, had a debate on the subject of strengthening the relations between the EU and the BSEC. On its side, the BSEC Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Moscow, 1 November 2006) adopted a Declaration containing specific references to the progress made in the process of enhancing BSEC-EU interaction and decided to authorise the Committee of Senior Officials to finalise the draft Working Paper on BSEC-EU interaction and to forward it to the EU institutions as an official BSEC document. The European Commission Communication on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy (COM(2006)726final, Brussels, 4 December 2006) specifically mentioned the possibility of closer contacts with the BSEC, including observer status. A further mission of the BSEC Troika (Brussels, 5-6 December 2006) had working contacts with officials of the European Parliament and European Commission and participated in a dedicated meeting of the COEST. The COEST Group of the EU, at its meeting in Brussels on 26 January 2006 considered the proposals submitted by the Hellenic Republic on the development of a possible Black Sea Dimension of the EU policies. An interim briefing on demarches undertaken 25 Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), Working Paper entitled Towards an EU Regional Dimension in the Wider Black Sea Area, paper, Athens, 25 January. 80 UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION VIEWS FROM THE REGION
y the Hellenic Republic was presented at the informal meeting of the BSEC Committee of Senior Officials at Sinaia, Romania, on 3 February 2006. The parallel efforts by the BSEC side led mainly by Greece (as the only EU member state of the BSEC at that time) and by the EU institutions led to the release of the Communication by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on ‘Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative’ 26 and the successful application of the Commission to an observer status with the Organisation (June 2007). What to expect next Broader geopolitical developments (e.g. the evolution of the Russian foreign policy in its ‘near abroad’ and beyond, energy security, war against terrorism, etc.) along with the state of affairs in the ‘frozen conflicts’ will undoubtedly determine the framework within which the Black Sea policy of Greece is to be shaped. Some key factors however which are more particular to the Black Sea case and need to be considered when thinking ahead on Greece’s Black Sea policy are summarised hereafter. Deepening of economic relations with the northern neighbours. Greece’s policy towards the Black Sea has developed primarily as part of its foreign economic relations. Evidence to that can be seen in the section dealing with the BSEC within the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs being under the Economic Diplomacy division. The economic rationale of Greece’s engagement with the region is to be strengthened along with the further deepening of economic relations between Greece and its northern neighbours as witnessed by an increase in trade and investments flows. The more interdependent Greek economic interests and the Black Sea business climate become, the more active Greek policy towards the Black Sea is to become. The EU factor in the evolution of the Russian and the Turkish Black Sea policy. The evolution of the Russian-EU affairs are fundamental for the future of the Black Sea region. As the core of the Black Sea area constitutes the ‘near abroad’ for Russia and the ‘new neighbourhood’ for the EU, any policy targeting the area has to acknowledge the dynamics of the interface of the relevant policies of these two dominant actors. The Black Sea is to constitute a bridge zone where multilateralism will flourish once the interests of the local states, the EU and Russia are all accommodated or it is to become a difficult area to operate in if those interests were to clash. 26 Commission of the European Communities (2007), Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative, [COM(2007) 160 final], Brussels, 11 April. 27 For the elements that make the BSEC a credible partner see Manoli, Panagiota (2006), Reflecting on the BSEC: Achievements, Limitations and the Way Forward, Policy Brief, no. 1, ICBSS, Athens, June. Available on http://www.icbss.org. X E N O P H O N P A P E R no 2 81
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Styopa Safaryan, Elkhan Nuriyev, Ma
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International Centre for Black Sea
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The Policy of Ukraine towards the B
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INTRODUCTION Panagiota Manoli This
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‘exchange of views’ into concre
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would also ensure its integration w
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Between optimism and pessimism: Arm
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Affirming their determination to ma
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Low regional cooperation isolating
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objective of the official policies
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number of foreign tourists who also
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● ● ● conditions. The absence
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AZERBAIJAN AND THE WIDER BLACK SEA
Page 31 and 32: monopolisation of oil supplies by a
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Page 37: elationship between Azerbaijan, Geo
Page 40 and 41: has furthermore been a keen support
Page 42 and 43: and four of them are with regional
Page 44 and 45: The Southeast Europe Defence Minist
Page 46 and 47: NATO’s reach at the Black Sea sho
Page 48 and 49: Secondly, there is the ENP mechanis
Page 50 and 51: in the Black Sea area perceive the
Page 52 and 53: outside. There are various factors
Page 54 and 55: to start, but now all are taking of
Page 56 and 57: Trade and economic relations of Geo
Page 58 and 59: development. Nevertheless, during i
Page 60 and 61: ● ● ● ● Additional Protocol
Page 62 and 63: Although regional cooperation appea
Page 64 and 65: cooperation’ in the Strategy Pape
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Page 68 and 69: through joint efforts the constant
Page 70 and 71: for the first time, and several min
Page 72 and 73: The Black Sea region has been an ar
Page 74 and 75: Based on its experience from EU int
Page 76 and 77: at a rapid pace. 14 It is estimated
Page 78 and 79: Fund of the BSEC. Along with the UN
Page 80 and 81: music, etc.). Greece has also under
Page 84 and 85: Turkish foreign policy on the other
Page 87 and 88: THE POLICY OF MOLDOVA TOWARDS THE B
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Page 91 and 92: meanings of the whole region. If th
Page 93 and 94: Ministers. This does not address ho
Page 95 and 96: establishment of parallel overlappi
Page 97 and 98: to new and diversified markets. In
Page 99 and 100: that both the EU and NATO enlargeme
Page 101 and 102: adjusting them to fit the emerging
Page 103 and 104: THE POLICY OF ROMANIA TOWARDS THE B
Page 105 and 106: they have undertaken. The involveme
Page 107 and 108: Along with Greece and other BSEC co
Page 109 and 110: unsettled disputes in the region on
Page 111 and 112: and timeliness of its participation
Page 113 and 114: UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC CO
Page 115 and 116: separatism. Many regional countries
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Page 119 and 120: What is the balance sheet of EU-Rus
Page 121 and 122: THE POLICY OF SERBIA TOWARDS THE BS
Page 123 and 124: At the very outset of dealing with
Page 125 and 126: The very concept of various paces o
Page 127 and 128: problems concerns the first proclai
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the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (in N
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After an enthusiastic start, howeve
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creation in the region since 1992.
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Although the initial step of the BS
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BSEC-EU Interaction after the ‘Bl
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one of the most conflict-prone regi
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The BSEC offers Ukraine the chance
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ethnic colouring. 2 Moreover, the i
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Cooperation, which took place in Ky
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A number of meetings between minist
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Ukraine has already implemented a f
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are being put forward by its member
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Strategically important transport p
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CONCLUSIONS: BALANCING NATIONAL INT
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een lagging behind the other transi
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most notably of Crime and Social Co
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School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
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HELBROK ICBSS ID INOGATE INSME IPAP
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