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NATO’s reach at the Black Sea shores. These two bodies – the EU and NATO- are the primary organisations through which Bulgaria’s interests and security concerns are being addressed. Bulgaria’s interaction with the EU and the NATO is a two-way process, in which the policies of these organisations are being brought into the national policymaking of Bulgaria and vice versa – Bulgaria’s policy agenda has been reflected into the agenda of the two organisations. In 2004, Bulgaria became a full-fledged member of NATO. It wasn’t long before the Bulgarian embassy in Tbilisi was selected to be NATO’s contact point for the South Caucasus. This was a symbolic move by which a country that just recently joined the North Atlantic Alliance is helping advance NATO’s policy in the region. For that matter, a pro-NATO political course is often misunderstood or misinterpreted outside of Central and Eastern Europe, the Black Sea included, as NATO somehow being juxtaposed to the European Union. Just the opposite, NATO and the EU reforms have been perceived in the Central European transition countries as the two sides of the same coin, namely pro-democratic and pro-market reforms. Thus, NATO and EU accession reforms were part of a single reform package and the reforming countries of the Black Sea sought to emulate this example – at least to the extent possible, as NATO and the EU had already changed their policies of enlargement. However, Bulgaria’s policy within NATO came at a price, as reflected to strained relations with two of its Black Sea neighbours – Turkey and Russia as any policy towards the Black Sea region is bound to face those two regional superpowers. Both Russia and Turkey are ‘status quo’ powers, which dislike any outside interference in the Black Sea region as, according to them, it might destroy the delicately balanced situation and relationships. In the case of Turkey, the cause was NATO’s plan to extend the naval anti-terrorist operation ‘Active Endeavour’ from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea basin. Bulgaria and Romania, the two other NATO members in the region, opted in favour of NATO’s intentions. Turkey vehemently opposed, citing the Montreux convention of 1936 stipulating that Turkey regulates the passage of the Bosporus and stay of navy vessels in the Black Sea. In order to defy NATO’s plans, Turkey has launched its own operation ‘Black Sea Harmony’ saying that any Black Sea country might join its national initiative. NATO withdrew its plans anyway as, apparently, the US did not want to antagonise unnecessarily its pivotal ally, but for quite some time the relations between NATO’s Black Sea members were definitely strained, which was reflected in their regional policies. While the issue with Turkey was somewhat a ‘family’ quarrel within NATO’s institutional framework, the issue with Russia was much more complicated. The Black Sea states are Russia’s immediate neighbourhood – it’s ‘near abroad’ – and Moscow opposes any outside involvement not only in the Black Sea basin, but in the neighbouring states, 44 UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION VIEWS FROM THE REGION
which are perceived as falling in its own sphere of influence at least for the last couple hundred years. Quite naturally, Bulgaria’s defence cooperation with Georgia became an issue of open criticism by the Russian authorities. Not so open were the critiques against the established New Group of Friends of Georgia and the support to the Georgia – Ukraine – Azerbaijan – Moldova (GUAM) grouping. Nevertheless, Bulgaria remained a supporter of NATO’s policy in the region, which was officially started with the communiqué of the Istanbul Summit and it was institutionalised through programs such as the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), the Defence Institutions Building Program (PAP-DIB) 11 and the anti-terrorist action plan (PAP-T) 12 within the Partnership for Peace Program. Bulgaria has been supportive to the desire of Ukraine and later on of Georgia to pursue an Intensified Dialogue (ID) with NATO for continuation of the reforms far ahead. The implementation of the IDs might be, as these countries hope, a step towards the Membership Action Plans for joining NATO. Related to NATO’s policy is Bulgaria’s defence cooperation with the United States, which culminated in signing a special agreement in 2006. 13 This defence cooperation agreement of Bulgaria (and Romania) with the US provided for the establishment of joint-use military facilities as officially dubbed, which the US military will use – including on the shores of the Black Sea. At first sight of the two major Western institutions – the EU and NATO – the latter seemed very active in the Black Sea region, especially with the IPAP and ID programs and the ever more intensely discussed prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining the North Atlantic Alliance together with the Adriatic Group countries. The EU on its part was hesitant to engage more resolutely in the region as a whole. Of course, it has been indirectly present with at least several sets of policies. Firstly, the EU accessed the Black Sea through enlargement, as Bulgaria and Romania became members in 2007. Turkey is a candidate country (with all the uncertainties down the road). The geographic presence of two EU member states – or three when Greece is also included as a key member of the BSEC - and one candidate country provide the EU with new stakes and mechanisms for operations in the region – including the funding for member countries, the pre-accession funds with the regional and cross-border cooperation (CBC) funds instrumental for regional cooperation. 11 Information on the Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institutions Building is available at http://www.nato. int/docu/basictxt/b040607e.htm. 12 Basic information available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b040623be.htm. 13 The text of the Bulgarian-US Defense Cooperation Agreement is available at http://sofia.usembassy.gov/uploads /images/JbIFtwHHCCQIa4RiY-GhsQ/Agreement_ EN.<strong>pdf</strong>. X E N O P H O N P A P E R no 2 45
Page 1: Styopa Safaryan, Elkhan Nuriyev, Ma
Page 4 and 5: International Centre for Black Sea
Page 6 and 7: The Policy of Ukraine towards the B
Page 9 and 10: INTRODUCTION Panagiota Manoli This
Page 11: ‘exchange of views’ into concre
Page 14 and 15: would also ensure its integration w
Page 16 and 17: Between optimism and pessimism: Arm
Page 18 and 19: Affirming their determination to ma
Page 20 and 21: Low regional cooperation isolating
Page 22 and 23: objective of the official policies
Page 24 and 25: number of foreign tourists who also
Page 26 and 27: ● ● ● conditions. The absence
Page 29 and 30: AZERBAIJAN AND THE WIDER BLACK SEA
Page 31 and 32: monopolisation of oil supplies by a
Page 33 and 34: significance of Azerbaijan as a key
Page 35 and 36: Paradoxically, Azerbaijan assumed t
Page 37: elationship between Azerbaijan, Geo
Page 40 and 41: has furthermore been a keen support
Page 42 and 43: and four of them are with regional
Page 44 and 45: The Southeast Europe Defence Minist
Page 48 and 49: Secondly, there is the ENP mechanis
Page 50 and 51: in the Black Sea area perceive the
Page 52 and 53: outside. There are various factors
Page 54 and 55: to start, but now all are taking of
Page 56 and 57: Trade and economic relations of Geo
Page 58 and 59: development. Nevertheless, during i
Page 60 and 61: ● ● ● ● Additional Protocol
Page 62 and 63: Although regional cooperation appea
Page 64 and 65: cooperation’ in the Strategy Pape
Page 66 and 67: the primary responsibility of the U
Page 68 and 69: through joint efforts the constant
Page 70 and 71: for the first time, and several min
Page 72 and 73: The Black Sea region has been an ar
Page 74 and 75: Based on its experience from EU int
Page 76 and 77: at a rapid pace. 14 It is estimated
Page 78 and 79: Fund of the BSEC. Along with the UN
Page 80 and 81: music, etc.). Greece has also under
Page 82 and 83: The process of opening up the dialo
Page 84 and 85: Turkish foreign policy on the other
Page 87 and 88: THE POLICY OF MOLDOVA TOWARDS THE B
Page 89 and 90: Transnistria). The region is also a
Page 91 and 92: meanings of the whole region. If th
Page 93 and 94: Ministers. This does not address ho
Page 95 and 96: establishment of parallel overlappi
Page 97 and 98:
to new and diversified markets. In
Page 99 and 100:
that both the EU and NATO enlargeme
Page 101 and 102:
adjusting them to fit the emerging
Page 103 and 104:
THE POLICY OF ROMANIA TOWARDS THE B
Page 105 and 106:
they have undertaken. The involveme
Page 107 and 108:
Along with Greece and other BSEC co
Page 109 and 110:
unsettled disputes in the region on
Page 111 and 112:
and timeliness of its participation
Page 113 and 114:
UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC CO
Page 115 and 116:
separatism. Many regional countries
Page 117 and 118:
Russia’s contribution to the BSEC
Page 119 and 120:
What is the balance sheet of EU-Rus
Page 121 and 122:
THE POLICY OF SERBIA TOWARDS THE BS
Page 123 and 124:
At the very outset of dealing with
Page 125 and 126:
The very concept of various paces o
Page 127 and 128:
problems concerns the first proclai
Page 129:
efore the UN and other global fora.
Page 132 and 133:
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (in N
Page 134 and 135:
After an enthusiastic start, howeve
Page 136 and 137:
creation in the region since 1992.
Page 138 and 139:
Although the initial step of the BS
Page 140 and 141:
BSEC-EU Interaction after the ‘Bl
Page 142 and 143:
one of the most conflict-prone regi
Page 144 and 145:
The BSEC offers Ukraine the chance
Page 146 and 147:
ethnic colouring. 2 Moreover, the i
Page 148 and 149:
Cooperation, which took place in Ky
Page 150 and 151:
A number of meetings between minist
Page 152 and 153:
Ukraine has already implemented a f
Page 154 and 155:
are being put forward by its member
Page 156 and 157:
Strategically important transport p
Page 159 and 160:
CONCLUSIONS: BALANCING NATIONAL INT
Page 161:
een lagging behind the other transi
Page 164 and 165:
most notably of Crime and Social Co
Page 166 and 167:
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
Page 168:
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