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Why Azerbaijan matters Sixteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan continues to adjust to the responsibilities of an independent state. Being a secular Muslim country with the largest population in the entire South Caucasus, Azerbaijan has close contacts with the Islamic world, but at the same time is influenced by neighbouring Christian nations oriented towards Western culture. Such an advantageous position at the junction of West and East has always allowed Azerbaijan to cultivate a synthesis of values from both cultures. However, given the complexity of the geopolitical environment and the lack of political experience to effectively cope with new challenges, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan will be successful in exploiting its economic advantages and achieving its strategic goals without strong support from the international community. Since gaining independence, Azerbaijan has received solid political and economic backing from most of the world and within international organisations, as this young aspiring democracy strives to restore its territorial integrity and consolidate its national sovereignty. Indeed, even despite the myriad of problems, Azerbaijan matters due to three major factors that make this post-Soviet country a special case. These are Azerbaijan’s energy resources, conflict resolution over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the country’s integration into the European community. It is the combination of the aforementioned issues that has placed Azerbaijan at the core of international relations. Caspian Pipeline Politics. Azerbaijan occupies a strategic location in the South Caucasus and the country’s resource-providing role in the pipeline game has regional implications for Europe in terms of energy security. The coming years will bring considerable oil revenues into Azerbaijan’s economy since this Caucasian state is re-emerging as a pivotal Caspian oil supplier. The newly inaugurated Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline has turned Azerbaijan into one of the world’s fastest-growing economies with a GDP over 26 percent last year. 1 This pipeline has contributed significantly to the process of integration within the Black Sea-Caspian basin and also serves as a good example of successful regional cooperation among three member states of the BSEC – Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. In fact, BTC links Azerbaijan to Western Europe and gives the country control over its own destiny by providing strategic options apart from Russia. At this point, the obvious European interests in the wider Black Sea-Caspian region are aimed at preserving stability in European energy markets and preventing the 1 With reference to the Statement of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Bakubased Trend News Agency reported on 14 November 2006 that Azerbaijan became the leader for economic growth rate compared to EU member states and countries of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). For more details, see EBRD (2006) ‘Transition Report 2006: Finance in Transition,’ London, November; also available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6813.htm (accessed: 15 March 2007). 28 UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION VIEWS FROM THE REGION
monopolisation of oil supplies by any one powerful country. BTC will drastically increase the mutual interdependence between the EU and Azerbaijan by adding roughly a million barrels of oil a day to the European marketplace. By the end of 2006, the BTC project pumped approximately 400,000 barrels per day of crude to the Mediterranean. In the same year, some 10 million tons of Azeri oil was transported via the BTC route and around 1.2 million tons of crude was exported via the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea to Europe. 2 Another important pipeline, known as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) runs parallel with BTC and is intended to carry natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field 3 to Georgia and then to Turkey, where it will be connected to the Turkish gas network through which Azerbaijan can deliver natural gas all over Europe. The country’s natural gas production from the Shah Deniz field will increase dramatically in the next few years. The ongoing development of the Shah Deniz field is expected to make Azerbaijan self-sufficient in natural gas and will result in substantial export revenues. The scale of the Shah Deniz project shows that Azerbaijan is firmly positioned to become a major gas exporter in the Black Sea-Caspian basin. Recently, Azerbaijan signed a purchase deal with Georgia on buying gas. Turkey is also committed to purchasing Azeri natural gas. Baku is currently conducting negotiations with Greece as well, and talks may possibly be extended further to the Balkans and even to Central European countries, which also have a serious market for gas. Accordingly, due to the presence of the BTC and BTE, Azerbaijan has emerged as a crucial linchpin of the Black Sea-Caspian region’s security. In the coming years, Azerbaijan will play an increasing role in providing a constant supply of oil and gas to European markets. This means that Azerbaijan will remain a major regional player not only in Caspian pipeline politics 4 but also in East-West trade relations. If and when the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is resolved in a peaceful way, Azerbaijan could possibly even be at the very centre of European energy politics. Armenian-Azeri Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The eighteen-year long and to date unresolved Armenian-Azeri conflict remains the most disturbing issue for the Azeri nation who demands Armenian forces be withdrawn from occupied Azeri territories and internally displaced persons returned to their homes. Yet, the delay of a solution to the 2 Personal communication with Richard Pegge, British Petroleum official, Baku office, Azerbaijan, 16 January 2007. 3 The Shah Deniz gas and condensate field is located in the Caspian Sea, approximately 100 kilometres southeast of Baku. For information, see ‘Azerbaijan,’ Country Analysis Briefs, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, August 2006; available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Azerbaijan/NaturalGas.html (accessed: 31 January 2007). 4 For a comprehensive analysis on this issue, see Nuriyev, Elkhan (2007), The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Conflicts, Caspian Oil and Great Power Politics, LIT Verlag, Germany. X E N O P H O N P A P E R no 2 29
Page 1: Styopa Safaryan, Elkhan Nuriyev, Ma
Page 4 and 5: International Centre for Black Sea
Page 6 and 7: The Policy of Ukraine towards the B
Page 9 and 10: INTRODUCTION Panagiota Manoli This
Page 11: ‘exchange of views’ into concre
Page 14 and 15: would also ensure its integration w
Page 16 and 17: Between optimism and pessimism: Arm
Page 18 and 19: Affirming their determination to ma
Page 20 and 21: Low regional cooperation isolating
Page 22 and 23: objective of the official policies
Page 24 and 25: number of foreign tourists who also
Page 26 and 27: ● ● ● conditions. The absence
Page 29: AZERBAIJAN AND THE WIDER BLACK SEA
Page 33 and 34: significance of Azerbaijan as a key
Page 35 and 36: Paradoxically, Azerbaijan assumed t
Page 37: elationship between Azerbaijan, Geo
Page 40 and 41: has furthermore been a keen support
Page 42 and 43: and four of them are with regional
Page 44 and 45: The Southeast Europe Defence Minist
Page 46 and 47: NATO’s reach at the Black Sea sho
Page 48 and 49: Secondly, there is the ENP mechanis
Page 50 and 51: in the Black Sea area perceive the
Page 52 and 53: outside. There are various factors
Page 54 and 55: to start, but now all are taking of
Page 56 and 57: Trade and economic relations of Geo
Page 58 and 59: development. Nevertheless, during i
Page 60 and 61: ● ● ● ● Additional Protocol
Page 62 and 63: Although regional cooperation appea
Page 64 and 65: cooperation’ in the Strategy Pape
Page 66 and 67: the primary responsibility of the U
Page 68 and 69: through joint efforts the constant
Page 70 and 71: for the first time, and several min
Page 72 and 73: The Black Sea region has been an ar
Page 74 and 75: Based on its experience from EU int
Page 76 and 77: at a rapid pace. 14 It is estimated
Page 78 and 79: Fund of the BSEC. Along with the UN
Page 80 and 81:
music, etc.). Greece has also under
Page 82 and 83:
The process of opening up the dialo
Page 84 and 85:
Turkish foreign policy on the other
Page 87 and 88:
THE POLICY OF MOLDOVA TOWARDS THE B
Page 89 and 90:
Transnistria). The region is also a
Page 91 and 92:
meanings of the whole region. If th
Page 93 and 94:
Ministers. This does not address ho
Page 95 and 96:
establishment of parallel overlappi
Page 97 and 98:
to new and diversified markets. In
Page 99 and 100:
that both the EU and NATO enlargeme
Page 101 and 102:
adjusting them to fit the emerging
Page 103 and 104:
THE POLICY OF ROMANIA TOWARDS THE B
Page 105 and 106:
they have undertaken. The involveme
Page 107 and 108:
Along with Greece and other BSEC co
Page 109 and 110:
unsettled disputes in the region on
Page 111 and 112:
and timeliness of its participation
Page 113 and 114:
UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC CO
Page 115 and 116:
separatism. Many regional countries
Page 117 and 118:
Russia’s contribution to the BSEC
Page 119 and 120:
What is the balance sheet of EU-Rus
Page 121 and 122:
THE POLICY OF SERBIA TOWARDS THE BS
Page 123 and 124:
At the very outset of dealing with
Page 125 and 126:
The very concept of various paces o
Page 127 and 128:
problems concerns the first proclai
Page 129:
efore the UN and other global fora.
Page 132 and 133:
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (in N
Page 134 and 135:
After an enthusiastic start, howeve
Page 136 and 137:
creation in the region since 1992.
Page 138 and 139:
Although the initial step of the BS
Page 140 and 141:
BSEC-EU Interaction after the ‘Bl
Page 142 and 143:
one of the most conflict-prone regi
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The BSEC offers Ukraine the chance
Page 146 and 147:
ethnic colouring. 2 Moreover, the i
Page 148 and 149:
Cooperation, which took place in Ky
Page 150 and 151:
A number of meetings between minist
Page 152 and 153:
Ukraine has already implemented a f
Page 154 and 155:
are being put forward by its member
Page 156 and 157:
Strategically important transport p
Page 159 and 160:
CONCLUSIONS: BALANCING NATIONAL INT
Page 161:
een lagging behind the other transi
Page 164 and 165:
most notably of Crime and Social Co
Page 166 and 167:
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
Page 168:
HELBROK ICBSS ID INOGATE INSME IPAP
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