Xenophon Paper 2 pdf - ICBSS
Xenophon Paper 2 pdf - ICBSS
Xenophon Paper 2 pdf - ICBSS
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are being put forward by its member states, thus complicating the coordination of efforts<br />
for common projects. Russia, on its term, tries to maintain a status of superpower heir<br />
of the USSR and to keep a traditional sphere of influence in the Black Sea region. Difficulties<br />
in Russia’s internal transformation and limited resources have narrowed these aspirations<br />
mainly to the region of the CIS in the first years after the collapse of the USSR. That is<br />
why Russia had a quite passive position in the BSEC programs. Only after 1995 did the<br />
Russian Federation actually develop a policy toward the region.<br />
First of all, Russia concentrates its efforts on keeping control over oil and gas pipelines<br />
and the main traffic of goods on railways, motorways and airways in the countries of<br />
Central Asia. Moscow shows a special interest in forcing Azerbaijan and other interested<br />
parties to agree to the transport of Caspian oil from Azerbaijan, through Russian oil<br />
pipelines and ports. In the last years, relations between Russia, on the one side, and<br />
Georgia and Ukraine, on the other, have greatly deteriorated. Russia’s policies are<br />
therefore aimed at maintaining the inviolability of its strategic interests in the region,<br />
which translates into dictating terms to other states in the region. The Russian Federation<br />
has done everything in its power to prevent political, economic and military efforts in<br />
Transcaucasus as well as to obstruct third states from having influence in the region (chiefly<br />
Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Iran).<br />
Turkey hopes to assert its own strong geopolitical position and to increase its economic<br />
power. Market reforms in the countries of the region are oriented not on the development<br />
of small and medium-size businesses but on the modernisation and transformation of<br />
the public sector, which unfortunately comes at the expense of international financial<br />
support. This fact also influences the Turkish position towards the BSEC which has<br />
been disappointing to the other members of the organisation. Greece as an EU member<br />
tries to use the advantages of a “mediator” role in relations with other countries of the<br />
BSEC, in particular in exploiting financial possibilities. For this, Greece has concentrated<br />
its efforts on the development of concrete projects, carried out with the financial support<br />
of the EU (the foundation of the BSTDB, the creation of the <strong>ICBSS</strong>, etc.).<br />
Greece’s initiatives are widely supported by Bulgaria, Romania and to a certain degree<br />
by Ukraine whose main foreign policy priority is joining the EU. In this respect, the<br />
elaboration of concrete projects could be an attempt to further cooperation in the Black<br />
Sea region through state interaction with international structures, which indirectly conduce<br />
to the processes of European integration.<br />
The South Caucasus countries concentrate their efforts on solving inner problems and settling<br />
disputes with neighbours. Their contribution to the development of the BSEC is so far<br />
minimum. Only Georgia for example actively conducts environmental protection activities.<br />
Unfortunately, achievements by the BSEC in creating a regional market and establishing<br />
cooperation in the field of investments remain limited. Trade among regional states has<br />
152 UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION VIEWS FROM THE REGION