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Turkish foreign policy on the other hand, has been significantly influenced by the requirements of EU accession. The evolution of Turkish relations with the EU will bear an impact on the employment of multilateralism in its vicinity. Past evidence has shown that regionalism either in Central Asia or the wider Black Sea has been used by Turkey to upgrade its geopolitical weight within the Euroatlantic family. A positive climate in EU-Turkish relations will underline a more constructive regional approach by the latter (i.e. in view of the Europeanization process that has already started in the countries of the region) and will allow new opportunities for further Greek-Turkish common stands and initiatives in this neighbourhood. A disillusionment with the EU accession might provoke a ‘return’ and more intense engagement of Turkey in its Northern and Northeast neighbourhood which would require a reassessment also on behalf of Greece. The emergence of a consolidated ‘Black Sea’ front within the EU structures. Greece along mainly with the new EU comer, Romania, and much less with Bulgaria (the latter being inactive in the BSEC – EU cause) has lobbied systematically within the EU organs for the adoption of a Black Sea synergy as a regional dimension of EU policies towards the Black Sea. Since 2007, it is for the first time that the Black Sea voice within the EU is strengthened and it is justified that the three countries mentioned above will be expected to join efforts to make the Black Sea Synergy working. Greece thus in acting as a bridge between the EU and the BSEC will no more be alone and its policy will have to balance the views of Romania and Bulgaria. It remains to be seen how the three countries will cooperate within the EU framework and formulate a common view of and common stand on how to implement the Black Sea Synergy and especially what the role of the BSEC and the other regional structures of the Black Sea is going to be. The prospects of other regional initiatives and the evolution of the Organisation of the BSEC. Though Greece has been supporting multilateralism in the Black Sea, it has put its political weight mainly behind the BSEC as the most credible regional partner. 27 Despite current positive signs on the role that the BSEC might contribute to the overall stability and development of the region, its added value and relevance still needs to be proven. Greece, as an EU member state, will be facing increasingly more challenges in the definition of the EU’s policy towards the region especially in devising multilateral and regional tools of EU engagement. Whether the BSEC will undertake the necessary reforms and set its own comprehensive strategy and agenda will also determine its value in Greece’s Black Sea policy. Other regional schemes that have emerged - competitive or complementary to the BSEC - might need to be re-assessed not only by Greece but also by all other players in the area. Regional affairs in the Balkan area will remain central in Greece’s foreign policy considerations and increasingly in Greece – EU affairs since slowly Southeast Europe becomes integrated in the EU. Nevertheless, the new neighbourhood of Greece is the 82 UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION VIEWS FROM THE REGION
Black Sea area and as in the 1990s we witnessed a Balkan-focused Greek foreign policy, we might well see a Black Sea – focused policy taking shape in the next decade. X E N O P H O N P A P E R no 2 83
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Styopa Safaryan, Elkhan Nuriyev, Ma
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International Centre for Black Sea
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The Policy of Ukraine towards the B
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INTRODUCTION Panagiota Manoli This
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‘exchange of views’ into concre
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would also ensure its integration w
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Between optimism and pessimism: Arm
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Affirming their determination to ma
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Low regional cooperation isolating
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objective of the official policies
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number of foreign tourists who also
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● ● ● conditions. The absence
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AZERBAIJAN AND THE WIDER BLACK SEA
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monopolisation of oil supplies by a
Page 33 and 34: significance of Azerbaijan as a key
Page 35 and 36: Paradoxically, Azerbaijan assumed t
Page 37: elationship between Azerbaijan, Geo
Page 40 and 41: has furthermore been a keen support
Page 42 and 43: and four of them are with regional
Page 44 and 45: The Southeast Europe Defence Minist
Page 46 and 47: NATO’s reach at the Black Sea sho
Page 48 and 49: Secondly, there is the ENP mechanis
Page 50 and 51: in the Black Sea area perceive the
Page 52 and 53: outside. There are various factors
Page 54 and 55: to start, but now all are taking of
Page 56 and 57: Trade and economic relations of Geo
Page 58 and 59: development. Nevertheless, during i
Page 60 and 61: ● ● ● ● Additional Protocol
Page 62 and 63: Although regional cooperation appea
Page 64 and 65: cooperation’ in the Strategy Pape
Page 66 and 67: the primary responsibility of the U
Page 68 and 69: through joint efforts the constant
Page 70 and 71: for the first time, and several min
Page 72 and 73: The Black Sea region has been an ar
Page 74 and 75: Based on its experience from EU int
Page 76 and 77: at a rapid pace. 14 It is estimated
Page 78 and 79: Fund of the BSEC. Along with the UN
Page 80 and 81: music, etc.). Greece has also under
Page 82 and 83: The process of opening up the dialo
Page 87 and 88: THE POLICY OF MOLDOVA TOWARDS THE B
Page 89 and 90: Transnistria). The region is also a
Page 91 and 92: meanings of the whole region. If th
Page 93 and 94: Ministers. This does not address ho
Page 95 and 96: establishment of parallel overlappi
Page 97 and 98: to new and diversified markets. In
Page 99 and 100: that both the EU and NATO enlargeme
Page 101 and 102: adjusting them to fit the emerging
Page 103 and 104: THE POLICY OF ROMANIA TOWARDS THE B
Page 105 and 106: they have undertaken. The involveme
Page 107 and 108: Along with Greece and other BSEC co
Page 109 and 110: unsettled disputes in the region on
Page 111 and 112: and timeliness of its participation
Page 113 and 114: UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC CO
Page 115 and 116: separatism. Many regional countries
Page 117 and 118: Russia’s contribution to the BSEC
Page 119 and 120: What is the balance sheet of EU-Rus
Page 121 and 122: THE POLICY OF SERBIA TOWARDS THE BS
Page 123 and 124: At the very outset of dealing with
Page 125 and 126: The very concept of various paces o
Page 127 and 128: problems concerns the first proclai
Page 129: efore the UN and other global fora.
Page 132 and 133: the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (in N
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After an enthusiastic start, howeve
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creation in the region since 1992.
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Although the initial step of the BS
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BSEC-EU Interaction after the ‘Bl
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one of the most conflict-prone regi
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The BSEC offers Ukraine the chance
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ethnic colouring. 2 Moreover, the i
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Cooperation, which took place in Ky
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A number of meetings between minist
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Ukraine has already implemented a f
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are being put forward by its member
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Strategically important transport p
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CONCLUSIONS: BALANCING NATIONAL INT
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een lagging behind the other transi
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most notably of Crime and Social Co
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School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
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