Xenophon Paper 2 pdf - ICBSS

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● ● ● conditions. The absence of such mechanisms and levers has pushed Armenia, in its long-term goal of full integration with Europe, to diverge from its vector of interest between Brussels and Moscow. In reality, BSEC countries strictly differ in their political and value systems as they put aside their nominal loyalty to democratic values. The heterogeneous nature of these political systems, which are the foundation of economy, put deep limitations on economic cooperation and integration. What is more, the political systems of several countries—Turkey and Russia, first and foremost—were only momentarily emancipated from imperial ambitions. They today again express envy toward, and take abrupt steps against the loss of their traditional hegemonic stance and the inclusion of new players. They are also not indifferent to the challenges introduced by other rebuilding countries and players in terms of regional competition. At the same time, the different value-oriented and geopolitical courses of BSEC countries and their societies obstruct the formation of the structure of a united regional identity. The incapability of BSEC countries to resolve regional security issues on their own, calls for further EU involvement, as well as expansion and enrooting of its value system. This can heal the wounds and the convoluted problems of the past and present. The EU must encourage those countries - including Armenia - which pursue the European ideal. The EU must ensure this commitment of deepening regional cooperation pursuant to the EU-Armenia Individual Action Plan signed in 2006 within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, assisting in the raising of the sovereignty and the consolidation of the security guarantees of Armenia, and other extremely-dependent countries. The EU-BSEC synergy programs could have vital importance in terms of real regional transformation. The BSEC’s agenda must include common sectoral objectives - but without hierarchy and special treatment - for all member states. The BSEC must be guided by the individual needs of precise countries and must propose plans and implement them in relation with those needs. The organisation must also see to it that the member countries defend the objectives and principles which it has set out. The resolution of political matters that stand in the way of developing unresolved regional relations, and ruling-out preconditions, is extremely important in terms of raising the efficiency of BSEC actions. In this sense, the EU’s potential and capability is substantial. By way of summary rather than a conclusion, following the Cold War, the Black Sea Basin (including other former socialist regions, which throughout centuries have become the stage for constant clash and rivalry among empires and states) is being subjected—sometimes with dramatic and irreversible developments—to the civilisational, (military-) political, economic, and cultural value transformation which has taken on the name ‘Europeanisation’. In contrast with the early 1990s, the Black Sea basin of today is already semi-European, geographically and geopolitically. Aside from being the next step in the enlargement of 24 UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION VIEWS FROM THE REGION
the European family and in the European integration, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s EU accession in January 2007 contained another message: Europe is persistently moving toward the East and the South without concealing its intention of achieving complete Europeanisation of the basin, and the strategic ideals of nearly all countries in the region are coherent to this intention. This notwithstanding, the most important present-day question is: Can the entire Black Sea region become European? The Black Sea Basin has truly transformed into a region where the European mixes with the non-European world and neighbourhood, and where unresolved historical and contemporary civilisational and politico-military challenges continue to be at play. Europeanisation has really become a challenge for the non-European part of the region which, in turn, has come to represent today the greatest challenge for an expanded Europe. While the BSEC must transform itself effectively on the one hand, the EU must also review its Synergy and Action Plans in the wider Black Sea basin. 13 This dynamic interplay must attempt to overcome the remaining geometrical constants—namely, the challenges for the political and economic cooperation among the countries—that have become a staple of the BSEC’s present-day agenda in lieu of its comprehensive transformation. The new horizons for economic cooperation, and the new boundaries of the expanded Europe, lie beyond this. 13 Commission of the European Communities (2007), Black Sea Synergy - A New Regional Cooperation Initiative, [COM(2007) 160 final], Brussels, 11 April. X E N O P H O N P A P E R no 2 25
Page 1: Styopa Safaryan, Elkhan Nuriyev, Ma
Page 4 and 5: International Centre for Black Sea
Page 6 and 7: The Policy of Ukraine towards the B
Page 9 and 10: INTRODUCTION Panagiota Manoli This
Page 11: ‘exchange of views’ into concre
Page 14 and 15: would also ensure its integration w
Page 16 and 17: Between optimism and pessimism: Arm
Page 18 and 19: Affirming their determination to ma
Page 20 and 21: Low regional cooperation isolating
Page 22 and 23: objective of the official policies
Page 24 and 25: number of foreign tourists who also
Page 29 and 30: AZERBAIJAN AND THE WIDER BLACK SEA
Page 31 and 32: monopolisation of oil supplies by a
Page 33 and 34: significance of Azerbaijan as a key
Page 35 and 36: Paradoxically, Azerbaijan assumed t
Page 37: elationship between Azerbaijan, Geo
Page 40 and 41: has furthermore been a keen support
Page 42 and 43: and four of them are with regional
Page 44 and 45: The Southeast Europe Defence Minist
Page 46 and 47: NATO’s reach at the Black Sea sho
Page 48 and 49: Secondly, there is the ENP mechanis
Page 50 and 51: in the Black Sea area perceive the
Page 52 and 53: outside. There are various factors
Page 54 and 55: to start, but now all are taking of
Page 56 and 57: Trade and economic relations of Geo
Page 58 and 59: development. Nevertheless, during i
Page 60 and 61: ● ● ● ● Additional Protocol
Page 62 and 63: Although regional cooperation appea
Page 64 and 65: cooperation’ in the Strategy Pape
Page 66 and 67: the primary responsibility of the U
Page 68 and 69: through joint efforts the constant
Page 70 and 71: for the first time, and several min
Page 72 and 73: The Black Sea region has been an ar
Page 74 and 75: Based on its experience from EU int
Page 76 and 77:
at a rapid pace. 14 It is estimated
Page 78 and 79:
Fund of the BSEC. Along with the UN
Page 80 and 81:
music, etc.). Greece has also under
Page 82 and 83:
The process of opening up the dialo
Page 84 and 85:
Turkish foreign policy on the other
Page 87 and 88:
THE POLICY OF MOLDOVA TOWARDS THE B
Page 89 and 90:
Transnistria). The region is also a
Page 91 and 92:
meanings of the whole region. If th
Page 93 and 94:
Ministers. This does not address ho
Page 95 and 96:
establishment of parallel overlappi
Page 97 and 98:
to new and diversified markets. In
Page 99 and 100:
that both the EU and NATO enlargeme
Page 101 and 102:
adjusting them to fit the emerging
Page 103 and 104:
THE POLICY OF ROMANIA TOWARDS THE B
Page 105 and 106:
they have undertaken. The involveme
Page 107 and 108:
Along with Greece and other BSEC co
Page 109 and 110:
unsettled disputes in the region on
Page 111 and 112:
and timeliness of its participation
Page 113 and 114:
UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC CO
Page 115 and 116:
separatism. Many regional countries
Page 117 and 118:
Russia’s contribution to the BSEC
Page 119 and 120:
What is the balance sheet of EU-Rus
Page 121 and 122:
THE POLICY OF SERBIA TOWARDS THE BS
Page 123 and 124:
At the very outset of dealing with
Page 125 and 126:
The very concept of various paces o
Page 127 and 128:
problems concerns the first proclai
Page 129:
efore the UN and other global fora.
Page 132 and 133:
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (in N
Page 134 and 135:
After an enthusiastic start, howeve
Page 136 and 137:
creation in the region since 1992.
Page 138 and 139:
Although the initial step of the BS
Page 140 and 141:
BSEC-EU Interaction after the ‘Bl
Page 142 and 143:
one of the most conflict-prone regi
Page 144 and 145:
The BSEC offers Ukraine the chance
Page 146 and 147:
ethnic colouring. 2 Moreover, the i
Page 148 and 149:
Cooperation, which took place in Ky
Page 150 and 151:
A number of meetings between minist
Page 152 and 153:
Ukraine has already implemented a f
Page 154 and 155:
are being put forward by its member
Page 156 and 157:
Strategically important transport p
Page 159 and 160:
CONCLUSIONS: BALANCING NATIONAL INT
Page 161:
een lagging behind the other transi
Page 164 and 165:
most notably of Crime and Social Co
Page 166 and 167:
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
Page 168:
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