Xenophon Paper 2 pdf - ICBSS

for the first time, and several ministerial and expert meetings were also planned. The
eastward orientation (at least as far as the membership was concerned) of the proposed
BSEC scheme was therefore met initially with Greek resistance. 3 This was also manifested
by the fact that Greece joined the Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC (PABSEC) only
in 1995, two years after its establishment. Although Greece’s participation in the BSEC
as a founding member had been made possible due to the invitation extended by the
Turkish President T. Ozal in 1992, its - late - accession to the PABSEC did not come as
a natural consequence of membership but on the contrary, encountered resistance. 4
Indeed, Greece had reservations over the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly
and its mode of functioning. According to Greek perceptions at that time, the BSEC
should have been confined to economic spheres of cooperation and not acquire a
political dimension.
However, developments in Europe in the course of 1991 had progressively changed
Greece’s position. The crisis and subsequent war-fighting in former Yugoslavia blocked
any effort to reconvene the Balkan cooperation bodies. Fearful of the regional
destabilisation potential, Greece was reluctant to accept the faits accomplis in the area
and the collapse of Balkan cooperation. 5 Its participation as a founding state in the
BSEC was seen as an insurance policy in case of a prolonged disorder in Yugoslavia
or diplomatic deadlock impeding the revival of the Balkan Conferences. At the same time
Greece’s participation in the BSEC following Ozal’s invitation was welcomed by Turkey
(contrary to what would happen three years later with Greek accession to the PABSEC).
Similarly with the inclusion of Armenia this enhanced Turkey’s role as a ‘bridge’ between
this region and the Euro-Atlantic space, and supported Turkey’s ongoing interest in
long term European integration, as well as reflected a reluctance to define its interests
in terms of bloc politics and hence to avoid the polarisation of critical policy issues. 6
Commending on the Greek policy toward the BSEC, the former Greek Minister of Foreign
Affairs, George Papandreou has argued that until 1995, Greece preferred to adopt a
relatively low profile. 7 However, since early 1995, Greece increased its interest and
started playing a more active role. Several factors have influenced this new attitude:
3 Couloumbis, Theodore and Prodromos Yannas (1995), ‘Alternative Futures in the Post-Cold War International
System and their Implications for Greece’, Suedosteuropa Aktuell, no 20, p. 43.
4 Greek membership was the only case where unanimous agreement could not be reached and Greece finally
joined PABSEC with the vote of seven out of nine members (Turkey and Azerbaijan abstained).
5 Valinakis, Yannis (1994), ‘La Grèce dans la nouvelle Europe’, Politique Etrangère, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 227-228.
6 Kirchner, Emil. ed. (1997), Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe, Manchester University Press, Manchester
and New York, pp. 45-46.
7 Panandreou, Georgios (2002), ‘Goodwill Message’, Black Sea Trend Review, vol. 1, issue 1, Summer, p. 18.
68 UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION VIEWS FROM THE REGION