Xenophon Paper 2 pdf - ICBSS

Looking back in time, one cannot but recognise that Russia has not found her proper
place in the Euro-Atlantic space and failed to formulate a viable strategy for the CIS. The
euphoria brought about by the disintegration of the USSR was replaced in Russia with
a sense of loss and defeat, and not on the distant approaches but in its immediate
neighbourhood. The ‘reassembling’ of the CIS under the aegis of Russia and the challenge
of concrete problems prompted its leadership to establish ‘special relationships’ with
the CIS states, which at the end of the day boiled down to Russia playing the role of a
donor to post-Soviet Newly Independent States. The regional post-Soviet states who were
gravitating towards the EU and NATO and didn’t see in Russia an attractive model for
their political and socio-economic evolution, could not, however, resist the temptation
of making an advantage of their ‘special relations’ with Russia when it served their
interests (first and foremost, by benefiting from special low prices for Russian gas and
oil). Russia’s emphasis on more pragmatic market relations with her closest neighbours
in the energy sphere brought about accusations of political blackmail and pressures visà-vis
these countries.
The absence of strategic goals in Russia’s relations with NATO and the EU, given their
policy of eastward enlargement, inevitably strengthened and continues to strengthen
the ‘great power’ sentiments of the Russian political elite, as well as its fears of a Western
strategy of ‘squeezing’ Moscow out of the zone of its vital interests – the CIS. The
enlargement of the EU, initially perceived as an objective process in the development
of a post-bipolar Europe, is increasingly seen by many in Russia as a source of new
challenges, and not only in connection with the problem of Kaliningrad (territorial integrity
of Russia, passenger and cargo transit, etc.), but also in connection with rivalries in the
post-Soviet space. Furthermore, the enlargement of the EU and NATO to the East has
traditionally been presented by Brussels as mutually complementary processes.
Furthermore, although NATO membership as an obligatory condition of EU membership
is not written into the Copenhagen Criteria, the latest enlargement of the European
Union to the post-communist countries of Central Europe attests that it has become an
obligatory condition de facto. First, these countries become part of the Western security
system and only afterwards can they count on EU membership. When applied to the
CIS, this practice creates serious problems in the relations with Russia and is sure to
increase confrontational trends in Europe. In other words, the proclaimed principle of
mutual ‘complementation’ of the EU and NATO enlargement is obviously and dangerously
at odds with Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet space.
Undoubtedly, the BSEC structure cannot resolve all contradictions between Russia, the
NIS and external actors but it creates a favourable environment for transforming competition
into cooperation by developing concrete regional projects.
114 UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION VIEWS FROM THE REGION