Xenophon Paper 2 pdf - ICBSS

Turkish foreign policy on the other hand, has been significantly influenced by the
requirements of EU accession. The evolution of Turkish relations with the EU will bear
an impact on the employment of multilateralism in its vicinity. Past evidence has shown
that regionalism either in Central Asia or the wider Black Sea has been used by Turkey
to upgrade its geopolitical weight within the Euroatlantic family. A positive climate in
EU-Turkish relations will underline a more constructive regional approach by the latter
(i.e. in view of the Europeanization process that has already started in the countries of
the region) and will allow new opportunities for further Greek-Turkish common stands
and initiatives in this neighbourhood. A disillusionment with the EU accession might
provoke a ‘return’ and more intense engagement of Turkey in its Northern and Northeast
neighbourhood which would require a reassessment also on behalf of Greece.
The emergence of a consolidated ‘Black Sea’ front within the EU structures. Greece
along mainly with the new EU comer, Romania, and much less with Bulgaria (the latter
being inactive in the BSEC – EU cause) has lobbied systematically within the EU organs
for the adoption of a Black Sea synergy as a regional dimension of EU policies towards
the Black Sea. Since 2007, it is for the first time that the Black Sea voice within the EU
is strengthened and it is justified that the three countries mentioned above will be
expected to join efforts to make the Black Sea Synergy working. Greece thus in acting
as a bridge between the EU and the BSEC will no more be alone and its policy will have
to balance the views of Romania and Bulgaria. It remains to be seen how the three
countries will cooperate within the EU framework and formulate a common view of and
common stand on how to implement the Black Sea Synergy and especially what the
role of the BSEC and the other regional structures of the Black Sea is going to be.
The prospects of other regional initiatives and the evolution of the Organisation of the
BSEC. Though Greece has been supporting multilateralism in the Black Sea, it has put
its political weight mainly behind the BSEC as the most credible regional partner. 27
Despite current positive signs on the role that the BSEC might contribute to the overall
stability and development of the region, its added value and relevance still needs to be
proven. Greece, as an EU member state, will be facing increasingly more challenges in
the definition of the EU’s policy towards the region especially in devising multilateral and
regional tools of EU engagement. Whether the BSEC will undertake the necessary
reforms and set its own comprehensive strategy and agenda will also determine its
value in Greece’s Black Sea policy. Other regional schemes that have emerged -
competitive or complementary to the BSEC - might need to be re-assessed not only by
Greece but also by all other players in the area.
Regional affairs in the Balkan area will remain central in Greece’s foreign policy
considerations and increasingly in Greece – EU affairs since slowly Southeast Europe
becomes integrated in the EU. Nevertheless, the new neighbourhood of Greece is the
82 UNFOLDING THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION VIEWS FROM THE REGION