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Exchange Rate Economics: Theories and Evidence

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Market microstructure approach 357<br />

negatively related to the spread because of economies of scale leading to more<br />

efficient processing of trades <strong>and</strong> greater competition amongst market makers.<br />

Jorion (1996),in turn,argues that this implies that expected volume should also be<br />

negatively related to the spread,a relationship which is formally captured in the<br />

model of Easley <strong>and</strong> O’Hara (1992). Furthermore,unexpected trading volume,<br />

since it reflects contemporaneous volatility through the mixture of distribution<br />

hypothesis,should be positively related to bid–ask spreads. In the context of the<br />

study discussed in Section 14.3,Jorion (1996) confirms the negative relationship<br />

between volatility <strong>and</strong> expected volume <strong>and</strong> he interprets these results as a confirmation<br />

that bid–ask spreads reflect primarily inventory carrying costs that depend<br />

primarily on price uncertainty <strong>and</strong> trading activity.<br />

Hseih <strong>and</strong> Kleidon (1996) empirically examine the predictions from the st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />

informational asymmetry models of Admati <strong>and</strong> Pfleiderer (1988) <strong>and</strong><br />

Subrahmanyam (1991),discussed earlier. In particular,Hseih <strong>and</strong> Kleidon (1996)<br />

use the data of Bollerslev <strong>and</strong> Domowitz (1993) (these data are Rueters indicative<br />

bid–ask quotes for the period 9 April–30 June 1989),in two markets,London <strong>and</strong><br />

New York. They show that the volume <strong>and</strong> volatility in these markets follows the<br />

same U-shaped pattern as in the NYSE: volume <strong>and</strong> volatility is much greater at<br />

the open <strong>and</strong> close of business. However,they also show that the bid–ask spread<br />

actually goes up at the open <strong>and</strong> close of markets <strong>and</strong> this is at odds with the<br />

key prediction of the Admati <strong>and</strong> Pfleiderer (1988) model. Subrahmanyam argues<br />

that this kind of result is consistent with his extension of the model to risk-averse<br />

traders: the increased trading by informed traders results in lower market liquidity<br />

<strong>and</strong> higher costs. However,Hseih <strong>and</strong> Kleidon (1996) argue that the asymmetric<br />

information models of Admati <strong>and</strong> Pfleiderer (1988) <strong>and</strong> Subrahmanyam (APS)<br />

are not consistent with foreign exchange data on spreads <strong>and</strong> volatility for two<br />

reasons. First,Subrahmanyam’s extension of the Admati <strong>and</strong> Pfleiderer model is<br />

at the cost of loosing the main prediction of their model,namely,the concentrated<br />

trading equilibrium to account for simultaneous high volume <strong>and</strong> high volatility.<br />

Second,another interesting feature of the empirical evidence presented by Hseih<br />

<strong>and</strong> Kleidon (1996) is that they find that at the time of the close of the London<br />

market,when volume <strong>and</strong> volatility is high,there is no corresponding high volume<br />

<strong>and</strong> volatility pattern in New York <strong>and</strong> this contradicts the kind of assymetric<br />

information model of APS where knowledge of the economic structure is common<br />

even in the presence of idiosynchratic information.<br />

Hseih <strong>and</strong> Kleidon (1996) propose two alternative explanations for the kind of<br />

results that they report. First,they propose using a broader class of information<br />

models <strong>and</strong>,in particular,those models which relax the assumption that traders<br />

have perfect knowledge about the preferences <strong>and</strong> beliefs of other traders in the<br />

market. What they have in mind is that with differential information sets at the<br />

start of a day’s trade,market participants need to get a ‘feel’ for the market at that<br />

time. The most important elements of this feel are participants in the market at<br />

that point in time <strong>and</strong> their trading behaviour immediately prior to the trading<br />

period. Hsieh <strong>and</strong> Kleidon (1996) go on to argue that ‘traders report that,until<br />

they have got a feel for the market they are uncertain of their view <strong>and</strong> hence,

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