Financial Sector Development in Africa: Opportunities ... - World Bank

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214 Dafe Table 6.3 (continued) Management and leadership Financing Incentives and motivation Capacity Historical legacies Relationship between key players Sources: Adapted from Moncrieffe and Luttrell 2005; Moore 2001. Who are the key actors? What is the degree to which power is vested in individuals? What is the financial balance of the organization? Is the budget sustainable? To what degree is the government selffinancing? What is the effect of funding source on policy preferences? What opportunities for career advancement are present? What is the level and distribution of remuneration for different personnel? What would be the benefits and losses from changes in incentives? What are the skills and resources of the personnel? Is the information base of the organization adequate for what it needs to do? Does the organization have the authority to define and implement policy? How do historical legacies affect: • roles and mandates? • organizational structure? • management and leadership? • financing? • incentives and motivation? • capacity? What is the historical foundation of these relationships? What is the power balance in these relationships? How and why have these relationships changed over time? What is the effect of alliances on policy preferences and policy processes? What impediments to and niches for collaboration across organizations and the public-private divide are present?
The Potential of Pro-Market Activism for Finance in Africa: A Political Economy Perspective 215 practitioners to support well-designed, time-bound activist policies to complement modernist approaches. But what if the political economy analysis suggests that the preconditions are not in place and governments are not likely to pursue activist policies successfully? The political economy framework drawn up in the last section emphasizes that policy choices are, at least to some extent, outcomes of the historical development path of a country. These historical foundations do not lend themselves to simple policy proposals because they suggest that there is some element of path-dependency in policy making. However, by taking the political economy framework as a starting point, it is possible to propose strategies for economic change in the short and longer terms, and also to draw policy implications for those African countries with a political environment unfavorable to activism. The political economy perspective suggests that policy makers and advisors in these countries seeking to promote access to finance need to pursue alternative strategies. In countries where activism is unlikely to work effectively, there are two main strategies to align the interests and incentives of the political and economic elites with those of the wider society. The first is to change the power balance in society to expand the space for reform policies; the second is to work within this power balance. Changing the power relationships within society. If the political economy analysis suggests that the political environment is not favorable to effective activist policy making, then one of the two main options is to implement policies that focus on changing the balance of power in society in a direction that is more favorable to inclusive financial systems. Such a strategy is clearly a complex, mid- to long-term, politically sensitive task. However, some donors, in concert with reform-oriented domestic constituencies and in some cases the diaspora, are already implementing strategies for strengthening the political power of those groups with an interest in a greater and more sustainable outreach of financial services. There is a large body of work (Przeworski 2000; Wittman 1989) that argues that one potential way to change the power balance within society is to change the political institutions and to try to induce greater political competition because this would stimulate more socially efficient policies. This argument is in line with the political institutions view of financial sector development, which explains the cross-country variation in financial development by variation in the degree of access to political institutions (Haber, North, and Weingast 2008). However, as outlined in previous sections, democracy has been a poor predictor for successful
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lic Disclosure Authorized Public Di
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Financial Sector Development in Afr
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Contents Foreword Acknowledgments E
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Contents vii PART III Safeguarding
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Contents ix 4.4 Size of Mortgage Lo
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xii Foreword In their own way, each
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xiv Acknowledgments led by Stefan N
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xvi Editors and Contributors of Acc
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xviii Editors and Contributors deve
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xx Abbreviations FSB FSD FSDT FSI G
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2 Beck and Maimbo to the bottom of
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4 Beck and Maimbo advocate a “bui
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CHAPTER 1 Microfinance in Africa Al
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Microfinance in Africa 9 Figure 1.1
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Microfinance in Africa 11 A Special
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Microfinance in Africa 13 Figure 1.
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Microfinance in Africa 15 Impedimen
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Microfinance in Africa 17 Figure 1.
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Microfinance in Africa 19 to physic
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Microfinance in Africa 21 Understan
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Microfinance in Africa 23 Some exam
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Table 1.2 Fanikisha Project Type of
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Microfinance in Africa 27 world reg
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Microfinance in Africa 29 implicitl
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Microfinance in Africa 31 Financial
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Microfinance in Africa 33 situation
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Microfinance in Africa 35 have yet
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Microfinance in Africa 37 9. This i
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Microfinance in Africa 39 Ehrbeck,
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CHAPTER 2 Mobile Financial Services
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Mobile Financial Services in Africa
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Table 2.2 African First- and Second
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Table 2A.1 ID and SIM Registration
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79 Guinea Yes http://fr.allafrica.c
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Togo Yes http://www.mediaf.org/fr/t
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84 Coates and Hofmeister chains. It
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86 Coates and Hofmeister unions in
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88 Coates and Hofmeister trap for t
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90 Coates and Hofmeister Sources of
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92 Coates and Hofmeister Box 3.1 Ca
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94 Coates and Hofmeister farm input
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96 Coates and Hofmeister Technical
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98 Coates and Hofmeister agree to b
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100 Coates and Hofmeister Box 3.3 C
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102 Coates and Hofmeister Attitudes
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104 Coates and Hofmeister developin
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106 Coates and Hofmeister specifica
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108 Coates and Hofmeister ———
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CHAPTER 4 Housing Finance Simon Wal
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Housing Finance 113 Figure 4.1 Mort
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Housing Finance 115 countries, down
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Housing Finance 117 • The housing
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Housing Finance 119 limited to a fe
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Housing Finance 121 housing and inf
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Housing Finance 123 borrowed by ext
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Housing Finance 125 Box 4.1 Afforda
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Housing Finance 127 Box 4.2 South A
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Housing Finance 129 the degree to w
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Housing Finance 131 markets is the
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Housing Finance 133 are unable to o
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Housing Finance 135 greenfield vent
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Housing Finance 137 Figure 4.5 Obst
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Housing Finance 139 changes in the
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Housing Finance 141 • Introduce a
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Housing Finance 143 Box 4.6 Progres
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Housing Finance 145 of the impact o
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Housing Finance 147 funds. Within s
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Housing Finance 149 Hassler, O., an
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CHAPTER 5 The Reform Agenda for Fin
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The Reform Agenda for Financial Reg
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Page 185 and 186: The Reform Agenda for Financial Reg
Page 199: PART IV Financial Sector Reform: Ac
Page 202 and 203: 180 Dafe lack access to external in
Page 204 and 205: 182 Dafe having a positive theory o
Page 206 and 207: 184 Dafe In sum, high transaction c
Page 208 and 209: 186 Dafe through the selective allo
Page 210 and 211: 188 Dafe institutions of the indust
Page 212 and 213: 190 Dafe the boundaries of informat
Page 214 and 215: 192 Dafe range of examples of both
Page 216 and 217: 194 Table 6.1 Period Since the end
Page 218 and 219: 196 Dafe state-owned financial inst
Page 220 and 221: 198 Dafe The degree of success, in
Page 222 and 223: 200 Dafe Although the current conse
Page 224 and 225: 202 Dafe The interdependence of the
Page 226 and 227: 204 Dafe in the 1980s and 1990s wer
Page 228 and 229: 206 Dafe Alternative Approaches to
Page 230 and 231: 208 Table 6.2 Approach to explain/
Page 232 and 233: 210 Dafe state-centered, and interd
Page 234 and 235: 212 Dafe particularly important fac
Page 238 and 239: 216 Dafe activism in the developing
Page 240 and 241: 218 Dafe structures can undermine m
Page 242 and 243: 220 Dafe Conclusion There is strong
Page 244 and 245: 222 Dafe policy is not straightforw
Page 246 and 247: 224 Dafe banks that open agents in
Page 248 and 249: 226 Dafe Bankable Frontier Associat
Page 250 and 251: 228 Dafe Goldsheid, R. 1958. “A S
Page 252 and 253: 230 Dafe ———. 2001. Types of
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