Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
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Here is a quite well known “flow” of decisions used by LBO <strong>funds</strong> to maximize their cash flow:<br />
Normally the target company is bought by a series of local holding companies. Each holding<br />
company is partly debt financed <strong>and</strong> owned by the next holding company, <strong>and</strong> the “upper”<br />
local holding company is owned by a Luxembourg holding company.<br />
In the case study of Viterra it is described how 90 % of the leverage buyout was financed by<br />
loans – an unusual high percentage for the purchase of stakes in a company.<br />
The Luxembourg holding company is owned by the private equity fund, which is normally a<br />
limited partnership domiciled in an off shore centre. The limited partnership will distribute the<br />
profit of the investment to the participants in the partnership (the investors of the private equity<br />
fund).<br />
Soon after the acquisition of the target company, it is taken private <strong>and</strong> de-listed at the stock<br />
exchange. One of the purposes of this exercise is to avoid the disclosure regulations of a<br />
publicly listed company.<br />
Soon after the acquisition the balance sheet of the target company is pressed for liquidity,<br />
both in terms of assets <strong>and</strong> by new loans in the target company. All this money is distributed<br />
as dividend to the holding company, which is the direct owner of the target company. This<br />
holding company has often arranged bridge financing, <strong>and</strong> this bridge financing is redeemed.<br />
The direct holding company can also distributed the received dividend to the next holding<br />
company, which can redeem their financing or just pay the interest on its loan. By this the<br />
target company is in reality self-financing its own take-over.<br />
However, this type of financing is not only arranged through dividends. The takeover process<br />
included substantial expenses to financial advisers, lawyers <strong>and</strong> other consultants. Often the<br />
expenses of a take-over are about 5% of the sum of the acquisition of the target company.<br />
Traditionally such expenses should be paid by the buyer, but in cases of a leverage buy-out,<br />
the LBO manager decides that the target company will have to pay these expenses.<br />
This type of financing, where the target company actually pays for its own take over, is of course<br />
not without consequences. The target company will be much more dependent on the general<br />
economic climate, <strong>and</strong> it will have problems financing necessary investment for new markets <strong>and</strong><br />
new products, innovations <strong>and</strong> R&D.<br />
1.4 The Effects of Debt Financing<br />
As a rule, target enterprises are burdened with a high level of debt as a result of leveraged<br />
buyout financing <strong>and</strong> dividend recaps by private equity <strong>funds</strong>. Their own capital is transformed<br />
into debt through the dissolution of undisclosed reserves <strong>and</strong> the sale of investment objects,<br />
which the private equity <strong>funds</strong> deem to be unnecessarily tying up capital. The enterprise is thus<br />
stripped of assets that could serve as a buffer in the event of a market slump, marketing difficulties<br />
or management errors, or could be used for investment in the sustainable development<br />
of the enterprise <strong>and</strong> innovation or human resource management <strong>and</strong> training. The strategic <strong>and</strong><br />
planning horizon of enterprises is shortened as a result of the influence of private equity <strong>funds</strong>.<br />
When the debt can no longer be serviced, the target enterprise can be pushed to the edge of<br />
bankruptcy.<br />
Part II – Six concerns about our European social market economy<br />
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