Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
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74<br />
2.8 When targeting a company<br />
When targeting a company, LBOs are typically acting in accordance to a common set of<br />
patterns, as we can deduce when we look at their practical leverage buy-outs in our case studies<br />
<strong>and</strong> in accessible studies.<br />
Extremely inexpensive loans have funded the acquisitions, because the <strong>funds</strong> usually only bring a<br />
small capital contribution <strong>and</strong> very large loans, which the companies afterwards have to pay back.<br />
This means that the LBOs see as target companies:<br />
Who has stable cash flow so that the repayment is secured?<br />
Who is fundamentally sound with a strong internal economy, high internal capital? This means<br />
that the LBO as new majority shareholder can decide on an extra shareholder dividend.<br />
Who – in some cases – can be acquired in the market at a price under the real market price?<br />
Who – in the case of stock market notifications – can be delisted immediately after an LBO<br />
acquisition?<br />
Who has a management amenable to “reasonable arguments”, as many LBOs put it, these<br />
being extraordinary bonuses, stock options to the company managements in the case of a<br />
realised acquisition?<br />
Who has a strong position within the specific market segment? Many infrastructure operators<br />
spanning the public sector <strong>and</strong> private market operations seem especially attractive to<br />
private equity <strong>funds</strong>. That is because the LBOs are looking for investment opportunities in<br />
highly imperfect markets, especially if the infrastructure operator is fully privatised <strong>and</strong> the<br />
management is “receptive” to a cooperative leverage buy-out.<br />
It is worthwhile underlining that the LBOs increasingly look at companies as bundles of assets<br />
<strong>and</strong> liabilities to be traded <strong>and</strong> not as much as companies with employees, jobs, <strong>and</strong> economic<br />
potential to develop further in the globalised economy.<br />
At the time investors – typically pension <strong>funds</strong> – buy into an LBO fund, they have no idea of what<br />
companies the fund will invest in.<br />
As part of the fund’s investment policy, the manager will invest according to the business opportunities<br />
generated by him or her. There is no performance projection or guaranteed return.<br />
Although historical results secured by a management team are good indicators of its skills, they<br />
cannot be considered as a guarantee of future results. Accordingly, the relationship between<br />
investors <strong>and</strong> managers is based on a high degree of trust. The managers, limited only by their<br />
contract, have a great degree of freedom to choose, follow up <strong>and</strong> sell the portfolio investments<br />
during the life of the fund.<br />
The private equity manager virtually always invests with a short term holding strategy. The typical<br />
stated holding period for a later stage investment is 3 to 5 years based on the team’s strategy<br />
<strong>and</strong> business plan for extracting value in the business. In practice we can see that the holding<br />
period is even shorter in many cases, down to 1-2 years <strong>and</strong> thereafter reselling.<br />
Unlike investors on the stock market who have access only to public information without being<br />
able to directly influence the behaviour of the companies in which they are shareholders, LBOs<br />
always go for direct management control. That is why LBOs nearly always go for majority shareholder<br />
positions.