Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
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ias by comparing the annual returns achieved by ‘live’ <strong>funds</strong> with a universe of live <strong>and</strong> defunct<br />
<strong>funds</strong> over the period 1996-2003. They found that the arithmetic mean of the annual returns of<br />
the live <strong>funds</strong> was 13.74% for the period whereas the arithmetic mean for all the <strong>funds</strong> (live <strong>and</strong><br />
defunct) was 9.32% – a difference of 4.42%. Naturally, all indices face problems with survivorship<br />
bias. However, Malkiel <strong>and</strong> Saha report that survivorship bias produced an overstatement<br />
of returns of 1.23% in mutual <strong>funds</strong>, compared to the 4.42% for hedge <strong>funds</strong> 17 .<br />
– Risk, volatility <strong>and</strong> attrition rates: In the past, hedge <strong>funds</strong> tended to exhibit low st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
deviations (volatility) <strong>and</strong> correlation with general equity indices offering significant potential for<br />
risk diversification. However, there appears to be a greater volatility in cross-sectional distribution<br />
of returns risk, i.e. a great risk of choosing a poor performing fund. Thus, Malkiel <strong>and</strong> Saha<br />
examined the cross-sectional st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation of different hedge fund categories over the<br />
period 1996-2003. They found that the st<strong>and</strong>ard deviation of their returns is considerably higher<br />
than it for mutual <strong>funds</strong>. In addition, Malkiel <strong>and</strong> Saha noted that the so called attrition rates –<br />
the proportion of <strong>funds</strong> that fail to survive – were three or four times higher than for mutual <strong>funds</strong><br />
over the period 1994-2003. In other words, the range of returns is much wider so while investors<br />
may face high rewards for selecting top-performing <strong>funds</strong>, they also face a high risk of picking a<br />
bad performer or a failing one.<br />
Assuming that hedge fund performance is overstated, what are factors in the current growth?<br />
We cannot ignore the fact that some hedge <strong>funds</strong> have delivered impressive investment returns.<br />
In addition, they do offer significant potential for risk diversification. However, we also believe<br />
that there are other important reasons for the current growth of AUM. Two relate to matters that<br />
we will deal with in greater detail in other parts of the report, so we will just briefly touch upon<br />
them here: the high performance fees paid to hedge fund managers <strong>and</strong> the likelihood of lower<br />
regulation <strong>and</strong> taxes.<br />
In traditional investment <strong>funds</strong>, managers typically charge a management fee for their services<br />
but do not take any profits. <strong>Hedge</strong> fund managers, by contrast, generally charge two fees:<br />
management fees, averaging 1.5%, <strong>and</strong> performance fees, averaging 25% of the net profits (see<br />
section 2.10). The high performance fees make it attractive to set them up. In other words, explanations<br />
for the rapid growth in AUM by hedge <strong>funds</strong> should also be sought on the supply side.<br />
In addition, the performance fee issue underlines the importance of calculating returns by HFs<br />
net of the (often very high) performance fees – something that many publicly available statistics<br />
do not do.<br />
Hitherto, low regulation <strong>and</strong>/or tax exemptions appear to have provided another important<br />
impetus to the growth of AUM by hedge <strong>funds</strong>, particularly the assets managed by offshore<br />
<strong>funds</strong>. Offshore <strong>funds</strong> are unregistered pooled investment <strong>funds</strong> domiciled in offshore centres<br />
like the Cayman Isl<strong>and</strong>s or the Virgin Isl<strong>and</strong>s. They are usually structured in a way that allows<br />
them to avoid various portfolio management restrictions that apply to registered <strong>funds</strong>. This<br />
might, for instance, be the case in terms of the use of leverage. In addition, offshore <strong>funds</strong> are<br />
likely to pay no tax, or much lower tax than both registered <strong>and</strong> unregistered domestic <strong>funds</strong>.<br />
Above, we showed how traditional institutional investors allocate ever more <strong>funds</strong> to hedge<br />
<strong>funds</strong>. As a result hedge fund managers may be facing new choices: would they align themselves<br />
with the large asset managers, who act as a distribution channel to institutional money<br />
<strong>and</strong> therefore seek to comply with the institution’s dem<strong>and</strong>s for transparency, strong governance<br />
<strong>and</strong> a robust operating environment? Or, would they choose to remain focused on the rich individuals<br />
<strong>and</strong> endowments, which allow more flexibility in the st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> often also the locality<br />
of operations? Given the size of traditional institutional investors, some managers are likely to<br />
choose the former option, thereby increasing the reach of existing regulations regarding traditional<br />
investment <strong>funds</strong>.<br />
17 Op. cit. p. 83-84.<br />
Part I – <strong>Hedge</strong> <strong>funds</strong> <strong>and</strong> private equity <strong>funds</strong> – how they work<br />
53