Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
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in the lowering of social <strong>and</strong> labour st<strong>and</strong>ards as a direct consequence of the manner of financing.<br />
The door should clearly be left open to desirable investment strategies.<br />
In the following section, priority proposals to be supported by the <strong>PES</strong> Group are set out.<br />
5.1 <strong>Hedge</strong> Funds<br />
Harmonisation of European HF <strong>and</strong> creation of a single supervisory body<br />
Our view is to fully harmonise European hedge <strong>funds</strong> (either single strategy, or FOHFs) in<br />
order to create a unitary category of onshore <strong>funds</strong> with a common minimum investment<br />
threshold, which could be lower in the case of FOHFs. By definition, it will never be possible to<br />
prohibit offshore <strong>funds</strong> at a worldwide level. So it seems more realistic to develop an onshore<br />
regime able to compete with offshore <strong>funds</strong>: it would obviously not prevent some investors from<br />
keeping their activities secret in offshore <strong>funds</strong> but it would offer an alternative choice for the<br />
rest of investors, through a higher level of safety, a guaranteed level of professionalism of fund<br />
managers, <strong>and</strong> an overseeing by regulators. Such EU regulated products will be offered as<br />
complementary to offshore <strong>funds</strong>, but their very existence will reduce the relative size of the<br />
offshore market.<br />
This EU regulated regime would not forbid Member States from retaining nationally regulated<br />
regimes. It should be primarily designed around the need for regulation of the professionals<br />
involved in the ‘value chain’: management company, <strong>and</strong> depositary/prime broker. It would focus<br />
on: registration of these professionals in the EU, a requirement for them to be fit <strong>and</strong> proper<br />
persons, minimum capital requirements <strong>and</strong> minimum rules on valuation of assets.<br />
We are fully aware of the political difficulty of introducing a common supervision of such products<br />
undertaken by a unique Supervisory Body (for instance a dedicated division of the ECB).<br />
Nevertheless we consider this the only effective solution to achieve such an aim. Therefore our<br />
target would be the introduction of a specific family of registered European single strategy <strong>funds</strong><br />
whose products <strong>and</strong> managers should be authorized <strong>and</strong> monitored by a unique specialised <strong>and</strong><br />
highly professional Authority, operating to reduce (<strong>and</strong> not to increase) the “regulatory arbitrage”<br />
provided by the main offshore locations (for instance in terms of length of the time to authorisation<br />
for new products or new investment companies). The second leg of this new European<br />
regulatory architecture should be the elimination of all the fiscal transparency incentives granted<br />
to the investment undertaken by institutional players (onshore FOHFs included), in vehicles not<br />
belonging to the above mentioned new family of European registered <strong>funds</strong>.<br />
New <strong>and</strong> better information st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />
New st<strong>and</strong>ards relating to the sale <strong>and</strong> promotion of alternative investment products need to<br />
be developed to protect consumers from mis-selling <strong>and</strong> misrepresentation of risk. These<br />
include:<br />
minimum investments for retail investors purchasing alternative investments directly without<br />
regulated advice. A minimum investment of Euro 100,000 is appropriate;<br />
rules should be developed to ensure that claims relating to investment performance <strong>and</strong> risks<br />
are honestly <strong>and</strong> clearly communicated to consumers. This means that promoters or intermediaries<br />
should not be allowed to be selective about the time periods used in promotions.<br />
Moreover, the use of independent benchmarks should be stipulated to prevent promoters<br />
selecting favourable investment universes to compare products;<br />
Part III – Lessons to be drawn for future regulation<br />
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