Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
Hedge funds and Private Equity - PES
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Corporate governance provisions<br />
Rules relating to the fair <strong>and</strong> equitable treatment of different classes of shareholder are needed<br />
to ensure that <strong>funds</strong> cannot use pricing policies to attract potential investors or dissuade potential<br />
sellers.<br />
Measures should be introduced through the insurance <strong>and</strong> occupational pension <strong>funds</strong> regulatory<br />
framework to ensure that high st<strong>and</strong>ards of due diligence are undertaken when alternative<br />
investments are included in pension fund or insurance fund portfolios.<br />
We can consider the introduction at European level of some regulatory quantitative or principlebased<br />
constraint on the alternative investments’ exposure of pension <strong>funds</strong> <strong>and</strong> other collective<br />
investment schemes such as mutual or insurance.<br />
Tax treatment<br />
Introduce a fiscal discrimination, to including FOHFs <strong>and</strong> all tax-exempt organisations, against<br />
offshore products <strong>and</strong> change the tax rules so that the location of the manager determines the<br />
tax position of hedge <strong>funds</strong>.<br />
5.2 <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> Funds<br />
Improving transparency<br />
The first regulatory step to be taken is to increase the transparency of alternative investment<br />
<strong>funds</strong> by requiring reporting at regular intervals to an appropriate regulatory authority on (i) the<br />
investment strategy of the company, (ii) details of the assets held by the company, (iii) disclosure<br />
of the ‘risk management’ model used (this is especially important for leveraged companies,<br />
<strong>and</strong> is already used for banks by the banking regulators), <strong>and</strong> (iv) the management’s incentive<br />
structure. Greater transparency is not enough by itself, but the premise here is that, due to inadequate<br />
transparency, many investors (including pension <strong>funds</strong> <strong>and</strong> so on) are not aware of the<br />
risks that alternative investment <strong>funds</strong> are taking in order to get a higher return. Many alternative<br />
investment companies would not be getting funding if investors were aware of these risks.<br />
Greater transparency is a requirement that persons from different ideological backgrounds (free<br />
market adherents included) can agree on.<br />
At EU level one could argue for a directive defining minimum st<strong>and</strong>ards for disclosure, based on a<br />
similar logic to the directive requiring disclosure of stock holdings of 5 per cent or more of a<br />
company’s total shares. Under this scenario, countries would still maintain their distinctive regulatory<br />
systems, but the imposition of minimum st<strong>and</strong>ards would help to reach a ‘level playing field’.<br />
Corporate governance provisions<br />
Long-term investors should be rewarded. This can be done by permitting weighting of voting<br />
rights according to duration of shareholding <strong>and</strong> by means of differentiated taxation of (capital <strong>and</strong><br />
dividend) income from shareholdings. Golden employee-owned shares are also an option to be<br />
further examined. Minimum holding periods to be eligible for tax exemption should be considered.<br />
In order to prevent value extraction, limitations on the withdrawal of liquid assets from the target<br />
company should be introduced. In particular the financing of dividend payouts via the imposition<br />
of additional debt on the company’s assets (leveraged recap) must be stopped. Most countries<br />
Part III – Lessons to be drawn for future regulation<br />
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