The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

U.S. refinery staff and capabilityBP has not always ensured that its U.S. refineries had sufficient staff and capability to promote strong process safety performance. Since theAmoco merger, BP has lost many people and capabilities in its refining operations for a variety of reasons: In connection with the merger, BP eliminated several thousand jobs in the United States, many in refining. BP decided to outsource much of the refining technology function, leading to the loss of several hundred engineers. As BP announced further restructurings and job reductions in refining, additional expertise left and was not replaced. BP’s U.S. refineries all had aging workforces. As employees retired, they typically were replaced by substantially younger and lessexperienced people.Over time, the cumulative effect of these decisions and events was a collective loss of human expertise in the refining business, both in the lineand in supporting functions.The Panel is not suggesting that BP intended to remove needed capability from its refinery operations. Rather, the Panel understands that BPtypically did not receive short-term negative feedback on its reorganizations or job reductions, and as a result, BP apparently believed that therefinery operations continued to have the necessary capabilities in place. Not until after a substantially longer period, however, did BP come toappreciate that it had lost, and had not replaced, valuable refining operating and technical expertise.Interviews of hourly workers and refinery management reveal that understaffing is a serious concern at all of the U.S. refineries except CherryPoint. In Toledo, the vast majority of hourly, management, and contractor interviewees said they believed that the refinery was understaffed invarious positions. Many of the Toledo interviewees reported the feeling that understaffing was among the most serious process safety issues atthat site. They also reported their belief that understaffing had precipitated low morale, poor communication, delayed responses betweendepartments and units, an inability to properly supervise contractors working on projects, and slow turnaround on hazard assessments andinvestigations. Similarly, survey data reveal that many employees believed there was insufficient staff in their work groups to perform their jobssafely. Contractors, however, generally expressed satisfaction with staffing levels in their work groups.Table 9“There is usually sufficient staff in mywork group to perform my job safely.”‡ Fewer than 25 respondents were in this group.Percentages ofDisagree/Tend toToledo GroupDisagree ResponsesMaintenance/Craft Technicians ‡ 50Engineering Professionals 44Operators 32Operations Management 29Full-Time HSSE Employees ‡ 21Contractors 4At Whiting, both hourly workers and management interviewed generally said they believed that operators and supervisors were stretched toothin to perform their functions safely. The interviewees reported that Whiting needed more operators, chief operators, and supervisors. ManyWhiting employees acknowledged that low supervisor pay and union negotiations under the collective bargaining agreement affected staffing.Corporate Safety Culture C 81