The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

Also indicative of perceived noncompliance with operating procedures and complacency toward risk, 33 percent of maintenance management 68expressed a belief that the refinery tolerated unapproved shortcuts around process safety. More than one-third of maintenance/crafttechnicians (35 percent) and contractors (34 percent) also responded in that manner. In contrast, HSSE employees, operations management,and engineering professionals provided relatively low negative response rates that reflect a more positive perspective of this process safetyissue.A similar data trend was evident in responses to the two companion survey items addressing whether supervisors ensured that proceduresrelating to operations and maintenance were safe before such activities were initiated. Maintenance management, maintenance/crafttechnicians, and contractors provided negative response rates ranging between 30 percent and 54 percent. Maintenance management yieldedthe highest negative response rates: 54 percent for the survey item related to operations procedures and 46 percent for the survey item relatedto maintenance procedures. 69 On the other hand, three of Carson’s other employee groups—HSSE employees, engineering professionals, andoperations management—provided much lower negative response rates for both items. This response trend helps to underscore the point thatmany employees at Carson expressed generally positive views regarding toleration of deviations from safe operating practices and complacencytoward serious process safety risks.Cherry Point. Like Carson, Cherry Point appears to have a stronger culture relating to operating discipline, toleration of deviations from safeoperating practices, and complacency toward serious process safety risks than do the other refineries. Unique challenges, however, confrontorganizations or sites with generally strong safety cultures. Success, if it leads to overconfidence, ironically can be one of the forerunners ofaccidents. The strong safety culture at Cherry Point may inadvertently foster an overconfidence among refinery personnel.For example, as discussed in greater detail in the technical consultants’ report attached as Appendix E, at least two sources external to CherryPoint recommended changes to the refinery’s inspection and testing program, especially with respect to the manner in which the site uses (ordoes not use) its inspection database—PCMS. A BP audit team first raised concerns around overdue inspections at Cherry Point during a 2002Process Safety Management audit. During the Panel’s review in 2006, the Panel’s technical consultants concluded that the Cherry Point refineryextended the test intervals in PCMS for relief valves beyond the amount permitted by the refinery’s inspection and testing procedure. Thetechnical consultants also learned that the refinery does not use the schedules established by PCMS, but instead determines relief valve testintervals based on turnaround schedules and the individual judgments of refinery personnel.Some managers at the refinery quickly rejected the conclusion of the Panel’s technical consultants. However, because a BP audit teampreviously expressed similar concerns, the Panel’s technical consultants believe that some individuals at the refinery are too confident in theirsystems, some of which have inherent limitations (such as relying on individual judgments of personnel to determine testing intervals). Such aresistance to external perspectives can undermine an otherwise strong safety culture.Surveyed contractors and employees in the nine process safety functional groups at Cherry Point routinely responded more positively than theircounterparts at BP’s other refineries, but Cherry Point responses nonetheless revealed some pockets of concern. For example, 25 percent ofoperators indicated an impression that workers sometimes worked around process safety concerns rather than report them. In addition,30 percent of maintenance/craft technicians expressed a belief that the refinery tolerated unapproved shortcuts around process safety. Finally,between 35 percent and 45 percent of contractors and maintenance/craft technicians disagreed or tended to disagree that supervisors ensuredthat procedures relating to operations and maintenance were safe before such activities were initiated.Again, notwithstanding these apparent pockets of concern, Cherry Point personnel generally provided positive responses to survey itemsaddressing deviations from safe operating practices and complacency toward serious process safety risks. Interviews of the Cherry Pointworkforce similarly revealed few issues with operating discipline, risk identification, tolerance of noncompliance, or risk complacency.Corporate Safety Culture C 125