The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

The Panel found other issues that can or do have a negative effect on Whiting’s safety culture: Many hourly workers interviewed perceived the culture as more reactive than proactive and believed that the refinery would makerepairs and spend money only after an accident. Numerous operators interviewed believed that budget constraints have affected preventive maintenance, and they pointed to variousexamples of major safety hazards remaining unaddressed despite repeated work order requests. Many hourly workers interviewed believed that senior refinery management was not sufficiently visible and that some managers hadso lost touch with the daily operations that they no longer understood the units they manage. Many hourly workers interviewed believed that supervisory oversight of safety varies considerably from unit to unit. Consistent with Whiting’s “can do” legacy, some hourly workers acknowledged that it was still common to deviate from procedures inorder to finish a job more quickly. Many interviewees were critical of the quality of training, expressed concerns about the qualifications of chief operators and firstlevel leaders, and some stated that hourly workers and supervisors were stretched too thinly to perform their safety functionsadequately.Moreover, interviewees almost uniformly reported that significant animosity and tension exists at Whiting between the unionized maintenanceemployees and contractors. This condition, which appears to be based upon the union’s perception that contractors are taking jobs away fromthe union, inhibits the sharing of information between contractors and employees. BP maintenance workers interviewed were critical ofcontractors, claiming that they were inexperienced, performed substandard work, and lacked sufficient knowledge about the refinery’s safetyprocesses and standards. Relations between unionized BP personnel and non-unionized contractors were so strained that the unionized BPpersonnel refused to work any jobs manned by “split crews” composed of both BP unionized employees and non-unionized contractors.The process safety culture survey data reflect some of the same mixed signals conveyed during interviews. For example, as represented inTable 24, many survey respondents expressed a belief that the refinery’s culture encouraged raising process safety concerns. Contractors andHSSE employees were less likely to respond positively; however, because 13 percent of both groups indicated that they did not know or have anopinion on the issue, their negative response rates were relatively low.Table 24“I believe a culture exists at thisrefinery that encourages raisingprocess safety concerns.”Whiting GroupPercentages of Agree/Tend toAgree ResponsesMaintenance Management 100Operations Management 89Engineering Professionals 89Maintenance/Craft Technicians 86Operators 84Contractors 77Full-Time HSSE Employees 74High percentages of the identified employee groups indicated that they did not hesitate to report actions or conditions that raised a processsafety concern, even when co-workers were involved. Contractors were, however, less likely to respond in that manner and, in fact, 20 percent ofthat group disagreed or tended to disagree that they did not hesitate to report.Corporate Safety Culture C 105