The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

elated to personal safety performance, the Panel believes (as BP aspires) that the ultimate goal for safety performance should be zeroincidents.Well-recognized and generally accepted lagging indicators exist in the United States for personal safety, but not for process safety. Becauseprocess safety accidents occur infrequently and are often unrelated to each other in their causal factors, past process safety accidents havelimited value in predicting future process-related incidents. Consequently, for purposes of managing process risks, organizations shoulddevelop leading process safety performance indicators that, if monitored, can be used to limit or prevent process-related incidents.ACTIVE MONITORING: USE OF LEADING INDICATORSActive monitoring 13 evaluates the present state of a facility through the routine and systematic inspection and testing of work systems,premises, plant, and equipment, including rotating equipment, pressure vessels, piping, relief valves, and other safety-related equipment. 14Some organizations use requirements around active monitoring as leading indicators to provide feedback on performance before an accident orincident occurs. 15As the term implies, leading indicators attempt to measure some variable that is believed to be an indicator or precursor of future safetyperformance, so that the desired safety outcome (i.e., no incidents) can be achieved. While useful in predicting future process safetyperformance, leading indicators are not absolutely predictive. For example, the percentage of equipment that is past due for inspection can beconsidered a process safety leading indicator because the metric relates to the physical condition of the facility as well as the effectiveness ofoversight systems. However, even if equipment inspections are current, equipment failures can still occur.USING BOTH LEADING AND LAGGING INDICATORSEffective measuring and evaluation systems utilize both leading and lagging indicators. The UK HSE recently proposed using a system of“dual assurance” with both leading and lagging indicators. 16 The UK HSE believes that employing both sets of indicators will provideassurances around the effectiveness of a site’s risk-control systems. 17 Trends in these indicators may provide advance notice of problems.C. Corporate Safety CultureThe safety literature contains a number of definitions of the terms “culture” and “safety culture.” 18 A 2003 research report on best practices incorporate safety and health among a number of U.S. companies highlighted the importance of the “shared” element of safety culture.Safety and health are (or have become) part of the company culture—and frequently part of the management system.“Culture” is traditionally defined as “a shared set of beliefs, norms, and practices, documented and communicatedthrough a common language.” The key word here is shared. Companies have found that if safety and health values arenot consistently (and constantly) shared at all levels of management and among all employees, any gains that resultfrom declaring safety and health excellence a “priority” are likely to be short-lived. 19An organization’s safety culture expresses itself within its own organizational structure, which may be simple or complex. A safety cultureevolves over time in response to various events, including changes in leadership and in management systems. Accordingly, an organization’ssafety culture at any point in time may be viewed as reflecting prior events or prior defining periods in the history of the organization, such asmergers and acquisitions, reorganizations, financial difficulties, technological changes, and management changes.Overview of Process Safety, Personal Safety, and Corporate Safety Culture C 23