The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

Table 27“In my opinion, process safetyprograms at my refinery have:[A]. An adequate number ofpeople responsible for processsafety[B]. Adequate funding.”Percentages of Disagree/Tend toDisagree ResponsesWhiting Group A BFull-Time HSSE Employees 41 44Engineering Professionals 24 31Operators 22 26Maintenance/Craft Technicians 19 20Operations Management 19 19Maintenance Management 9 12Contractors 9 5Finally, relatively high percentages of certain employee groups indicated a belief that they could not influence process safety policies at theWhiting refinery. Negative response rates exceeded 25 percent for maintenance/craft technicians and operators, and they were just under20 percent for contractors and HSSE employees. In contrast, maintenance management, engineering professionals, and particularly operationsmanagement responded more positively, as reflected by the low percentages of negative responses in Table 28.Table 28“I feel that I can influence theprocess safety policiesimplemented at this refinery.”Whiting GroupPercentages of Disagree/Tend toDisagree ResponsesMaintenance/Craft Technicians 38Operators 26Contractors 18Full-Time HSSE Employees 18Maintenance Management 12Engineering Professionals 10Operations Management 3While the data indicate a mixed process safety culture at Whiting, all interviewed constituencies at that refinery—site management, theunionized employees, and contractors—believe that the refinery’s process safety culture is improving.Texas City process safety culture. BP’s Texas City refinery has had a troubled process safety culture history. While the Panel did not conducta detailed historical analysis, the Panel observed that Texas City’s safety culture problems were very serious and appear to have gone backmany years, pre-dating BP’s merger with Amoco. The Panel also noted that following the March 2005 accident, BP initiated many changes atTexas City, and these appear to be making the safety culture at the refinery better. Perhaps even more importantly, BP shut down the entirerefinery in September 2005 in anticipation of Hurricane Rita. The refinery remained completely out of operation for six months while BPCorporate Safety Culture C 107