The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

Computer-based training. Based upon information it received, the Panel believes that at most of BP’s U.S. refineries, the implementation ofand overreliance on BP’s computer-based training contributes to inadequate process safety training of refinery employees. BP has multipletraining methods at its disposal for training operators at its U.S. refineries. Such training methods include computer-based training, gun drills,mentoring, on-the-job training, and classroom training, and each of these methods has advantages and limitations. For example, computerbasedtraining, while useful for informing personnel about changes and effective in teaching certain types of subject matter, is less effective atdeveloping adequate process safety awareness and the skills and ability needed to apply knowledge in actual operations.At all of the refineries except Cherry Point, both hourly and management level interviewees reported that training was inadequate because ittended to rely too heavily on computer-based training. Comments from corporate-level managers generally reinforced this view, confirming thatBP’s U.S. refineries rely too heavily on computer-based training programs and indicating that BP’s refinery training program needs to consist ofa better blend of hands-on and computer-based training. Additionally, the Mogford Report, in addressing the training at Texas City, states that“[t]he heavy reliance on computer based training . . . appears to limit the overall effectiveness of the training program.” 58Feedback that the Panel received during its review indicates that effectiveness of the computer-based training itself suffers from an apparentlack of rigor and an inability to adequately assess a worker’s overall knowledge and skill level. Both hourly and management-level employeesstated during interviews that computer-based training was “easy” to pass and that a correlation did not always exist between a givenemployee’s ability to pass the computer-based training tests and his or her abilities in the field. For example, a 2001 root cause analysis reportrelating to an incident at the Toledo refinery involving an operator stated that the training system does not fully assess if a person has masteredthe material being taught, noting that the operator in question passed a training test with a 100 percent score. Although employees musteventually pass the computer-based tests, BP’s U.S. refineries commonly provide repeated opportunities for employees to retake the same testsif needed. Some employees suggested that these repeat opportunities were almost unlimited. Interviewees also indicated that an employeecould take an exam, find out what questions he got wrong and why, and then immediately retake the exact same exam with the same questions.Moreover, employees interviewed at different refineries stated that because of this system of repeatedly retaking the same computer tests, itwas virtually impossible for workers ultimately to fail the computerized tests. Hourly workers also mentioned instances in which supervisorstook the training tests for workers.Finding:At most of BP’s U.S. refineries, the implementation of and over-reliance on BP’s computer-based trainingcontributes to inadequate process safety training of refinery employees.Process Safety Management Systems C 164