The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

Table 51Percentages of Disagree/Tend to Disagree Responses to Survey Item:“The following receive the necessary process safety training to do their job safely:Contractors.”Category Carson Cherry Point Texas City Toledo WhitingOperators 18 11 39 38 12Maintenance/Craft Technicians 21 8 37 56 ‡ 21Full-Time HSSE Employees 3 8 37 21 ‡ 21Engineering Professionals 3 5 18 27 8Operations Management 3 2 31 12 1Maintenance Management 0 ‡ 13 ‡ 22 * 6Contractors 15 18 16 20 21* Survey data are not available because of the small number (fewer than 15) of potential respondents.‡ Fewer than 25 respondents were in this group.Survey data on adequacy of training to prevent incident. Survey data provide a mixed message regarding perceptions of whether processsafety training was adequate to prevent process-related incidents, accidents, and near misses. Responses were fairly positive overall at Carsonand Cherry Point. However, a relatively high percentage of certain workers in various process safety functional groups at Texas City, Toledo, andWhiting expressed a belief that such training was inadequate. At Texas City, for example, 31 percent of operators, maintenance/crafttechnicians, HSSE employees, and engineering professionals responded negatively. Twenty-nine percent of operators and 25 percent ofmaintenance/craft technicians at Toledo 55 responded in the same manner, as did 23 percent of operators and 20 percent of maintenance/crafttechnicians at Whiting.Survey data on adequacy of training to shut down a process. Finally, pockets of concern were evident in responses to a survey item aboutwhether process safety training enabled workers to recognize when processes should be shut down if safety critical interlocks, alarms, or otherprocess safety devices failed or became unavailable during operation. Thirty-eight percent of maintenance/craft technicians at Texas City andToledo 56 did not believe that their training allowed them to recognize when a process should be shut down in such a situation. At Whiting,29 percent of maintenance/craft technicians responded in the same manner. Other personnel who had relatively high negative response ratesincluded operators at Toledo (22 percent); HSSE employees at Toledo (32 percent) 57 and Cherry Point (23 percent); engineering professionals atToledo (31 percent), Texas City (27 percent), and Whiting (22 percent); and contractors at Whiting (28 percent) and Cherry Point (22 percent).With the exception of maintenance management at Texas City (20 percent negative response rate), however, management tended to producerelatively low percentages of negative responses.Other information relating to training and competency. Additionally, a number of hourly, refinery management and supervisors, andcorporate level managers who were interviewed indicated that the training for operators at BP’s U.S. refineries often is not sufficiently rigorousor extensive to prepare operators for the full range of their job responsibilities. According to BP’s 2005 Integrity Management Report that BPGroup Technology prepared, 46 percent of integrity management major incidents in the BP Group were linked to a lack of competence, whichincludes a lack of appropriate training. While this figure is not limited to Refining, it does include incidents from Refining.In a 2005 behavioral safety culture assessment report for Whiting, hourly employees indicated that training lacked rigor and was focused ontraining for compliance rather than training for execution excellence. Moreover, the same report states that “[t]here is concern that employeesare not adequately skilled in ‘picking out weak signals’ and are not able to deal effectively with weak signals when they do recognize them.” TheProcess Safety Management Systems C 162