The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

Inadequate process safety knowledge and competency is a theme common to other panel findingsThe Panel also believes that deficiencies relating to process risk knowledge and competence in BP’s U.S. refining organization are likelycontributing causal factors for other findings elsewhere in this report. For example, Instances of a lack of operating discipline, toleration of serious deviations from safe operating practices, and apparent complacencytoward serious process safety risks existed at each of BP’s U.S. refineries. BP has not adequately established process safety as a core value across its five U.S. refineries. BP mistakenly used improving personal safety performance (i.e., personal injury rates) as an indication of acceptable process safetyperformance at its five U.S. refineries; BP’s reliance on this data and inadequate process safety understanding created a false senseof confidence that it was properly addressing process safety risks at those refineries. BP’s investigation system has not instituted effective root cause analysis procedures to identify systemic causal factors. BP’s process safety management system likely results in under reporting of incidents and near misses at BP’s U.S. refineries.As discussed elsewhere in this report, the Panel believes that the effects of widespread deficiencies in process safety training and educationhave manifested themselves in a number of ways at BP’s U.S. refineries.> Steps BP has taken to dateIn recognition of the need to better determine the qualifications and competencies required of its workforce, including its U.S. refiningworkforce, BP has established in its Safety and Operations functional group a new position titled Vice-President of Organization Capability. BPhas advised that the responsibilities of this position include developing plans to identify the skills and capabilities that are required fordifferent work groups within the BP organization, including the U.S. refineries; assessing the capabilities of the workforce; and addressing anygaps or deficiencies in skills and capabilities through, among other things, training and development programs. BP has also advised that its Safety and Operations functional group is developing Group-wide training programs for leaders, including first level leaders(supervisors), superintendents, and operators; the training programs being developed for leaders include new training protocols and standards on safety across the Group; Refining has instituted an operations superintendent training program; its human resources function is developing Group-wide training programs for all managers and supervisors; and its Safety and Operations functional group is developing a set of standardized principles and expectations for board operatortraining.In addition, the Panel understands that BP has taken or has begun to take a number of actions at Texas City relating to training and skilldevelopment. For example, BP has advised that at Texas City, it has instituted leadership development and other training programs involving aprojected 300,000 training hours per year and has implemented enhanced training programs for all employees, including orientation for newhires, start-up and distillation training, and education on safety and environmental compliance, operations, and operator competency. For abrief listing of measures that BP has undertaken or announced since March 2005, including measures relating to training, see “BP Post-TexasCity Measures” in Appendix F.Process Safety Management Systems C 165