The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

Finally, relatively high percentages of operators (22 percent) and maintenance/craft technicians 66 (50 percent) at Toledo expressed a beliefthat written operating procedures were not followed regularly. Similarly high rates of operators (31 percent) and maintenance/craft technicians(56 percent) 67 indicated a perception that written operating procedures were not kept up to date. On the other hand, there were severalresponses indicative of a different view. For example, engineering professionals and operations management responded positively overall and,similarly, provided low negative response rates that ranged from zero percent to 15 percent.Whiting. BP documents indicate concern with operating discipline, noncompliance with procedures, and apparent complacency towardprocess safety risks. For example, a “Whiting Safety Culture” summary prepared in November 2004 noted that workers “tolerate[] too much riskin their activities and environment leading to working outside of the controls put in place to safeguard them.” A 2005 behavioral cultureassessment of Whiting reported conflicting messages about safety, ingrained deviation from certain safety requirements among workers, overemphasison output metrics rather than individual safety performance, and heavy workloads that appeared to prevent supervisors and teamleaders from asserting strong safety leadership.Interviews of Whiting hourly workers revealed issues with operating discipline, noncompliance with procedures, and apparent complacencytoward process safety risks. Many hourly employees identified the absence of certain plant-wide safety practices as a major reason personnelfail to follow safe operating procedures. In the absence of uniform safety practices, safety expectations fluctuate sharply among the variousprocess units and leave each unit to create, enforce, and maintain its own safety identity. One example that a number of interviewed hourlyworkers cited is the absence of a uniform Lock Out Tag Out policy (LOTO). Because no single policy is enforced, each unit applies its own LOTOpolicy, creating uncertainty for operators and contractors. Hourly workers also expressed concern that a number of new first level leaders areunderqualified for their positions. This concern leads to situations in which many veteran employees disregard the instructions they receivefrom their inexperienced supervisors.The technical consultants’ findings relating to rupture disks on relief valves in the Whiting refinery further illustrates toleration of seriousdeviations from safe operating practices and apparent complacency toward serious process safety risks. See Appendix D for a more completediscussion of the Whiting rupture disk investigation.Process safety culture survey data also suggest complacency toward process safety risk at the refinery. For instance, 37 percent of employees inthe nine process safety functional groups, as a whole, expressed a belief that workers sometimes worked around process safety concerns ratherthan reporting them. Operators, HSSE employees, and maintenance/craft technicians provided the highest negative response rates, whichranged from 39 percent to 45 percent. As indicated below, other employee groups and contractors also provided negative response ratesexceeding 20 percent.Table 38“Workers sometimes work aroundprocess safety concerns ratherthan report them.”Whiting GroupPercentages of Agree/Tend toAgree ResponsesOperators 45Full-Time HSSE Employees 41Maintenance/Craft Technicians 39Engineering Professionals 32Operations Management 32Contractors 29Maintenance Management 21Corporate Safety Culture C 123