- Page 1 and 2: JANUARY 2007THE REPORT OFTHE BP U.S
- Page 3 and 4: PANEL STATEMENTProcess safety accid
- Page 5 and 6: RETIRED ADMIRAL FRANK L. “SKIP”
- Page 7 and 8: DR. NANCY LEVESON is a Professor of
- Page 9 and 10: DR. DOUGLAS A. WIEGMANN, Ph.D. is t
- Page 11 and 12: • Dennis C. Hendershot, Principal
- Page 13 and 14: The Panel’s FindingsThe Panel foc
- Page 15 and 16: Process safety cultures at BP’s U
- Page 17 and 18: Process safety audits. The Panel fo
- Page 19 and 20: RECOMMENDATION #5 - CLEARLY DEFINED
- Page 24 and 25: B. BP Group-Level Standards, Practi
- Page 26 and 27: efinery interviews. Finally, the Pa
- Page 28 and 29: OtherMike Considine—Head of Major
- Page 30 and 31: equirements. However, the technical
- Page 32 and 33: perceptions regarding various aspec
- Page 34 and 35: The Panel is also mindful, as reade
- Page 36 and 37: its staff, or its technical consult
- Page 38 and 39: effective process control, procedur
- Page 40 and 41: ENDNOTES FOR SECTION I 41 The Panel
- Page 42 and 43: (3) The raffinate splitter tower ha
- Page 44 and 45: In performing its audit review, the
- Page 46 and 47: Regulatory systems. Process safety
- Page 48 and 49: Some of these prior events or defin
- Page 50 and 51: “The attitudes, beliefs and perce
- Page 52 and 53: BP’s Board of Directors is made u
- Page 54 and 55: each of BP’s business segments mu
- Page 56 and 57: BUSINESS UNIT (REFINERY)Each refine
- Page 58 and 59: egion; creating both top-down and
- Page 60 and 61: BP has not yet established formal t
- Page 62 and 63: esponsibilities include building BP
- Page 64 and 65: Refining Technology also belong to
- Page 66 and 67: While the site engineering authorit
- Page 68 and 69: ENDNOTES FOR SECTION IV1 Forbes.com
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V. BP’S HSSE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
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BP CODE OF CONDUCTThe Code of Condu
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BP process safety/integrity managem
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Approximately 50 major categories o
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Once the Group Refining Leadership
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32 BP p.l.c., “BP Group Standard,
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Fourth, BP did not effectively inco
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interviewed expressed skepticism ab
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Table 2Percentages of Disagree/Tend
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Process safety leadershipThe Panel
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in the U.S. refineries. These oppor
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The metrics and milestones in a ref
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Reliance on injury ratesBP’s exec
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By using a formal management of cha
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Table 5Percentages of Disagree/Tend
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Table 7Percentages of Disagree/Tend
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RESOURCES AND POSITIONINGThe Panel
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The Panel’s review indicates that
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elated requests, the lack of histor
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Initiative overloadBP’s corporate
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Perhaps more significantly, BP’s
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INCORPORATION OF PROCESS SAFETY INT
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accountability, unclear roles and r
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the Refining and Marketing senior e
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Table 14Percentages of Agree/Tend t
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distrust or hostility, this relatio
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Despite data demonstrating a number
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Results from the process safety cul
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Despite the many positive aspects o
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Table 25“I do not hesitate to rep
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conducted a comprehensive inspectio
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had a much greater focus on persona
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Again similar to interviewees, many
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The interviews of Toledo hourly wor
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Table 33“This refinery provides a
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Table 35“I feel that I can influe
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SHARED PROCESS SAFETY CULTURE ISSUE
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operators changing alarm set points
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In response to other survey items a
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Finally, the Panel notes that BP ha
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20 James Reason, “Achieving a Saf
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B. Process Safety Management System
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compliance with internal process sa
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For example, at the Whiting refiner
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Finding:BP’s safety management sy
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workforce that it is not important
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exceptions. For example, at Texas C
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2004 Internal Audit. An internal au
- Page 169 and 170:
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXTERNAL GOOD ENG
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standards reflected changes in exte
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PROCESS SAFETY KNOWLEDGE AND COMPET
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Moreover, the new 2006 integrity ma
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Refinery personnel and contractorsT
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determined, based on interviews of
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Information from refinery-level int
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Survey data on understanding of pro
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Another survey item addressing supe
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Whiting report also states that “
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Inadequate process safety knowledge
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gHSEr also discusses briefly some k
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specified number of years. Second,
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The Mogford ReportThe Mogford Repor
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MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES IN PROCESS SA
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The report goes on to highlight a
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OBSERVATIONS ON NOTABLE PRACTICES A
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ENDNOTES FOR SECTION VI.B1 See Sect
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46 BP p.l.c., John Mogford, “Fata
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countries, many of the underlying d
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The annual HSSE performance report
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Issues with loss of containment wer
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Toledo RefineryArea of Overdue Insp
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The Panel’s technical consultants
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case frequency], [green house gas])
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Notwithstanding these efforts, the
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BP’s methods of root cause analys
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Furthermore, many of the listed sys
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In its report, BP identifies the fo
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BP’S REPORTING OF INCIDENTS AND N
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Table 63Number of High Potential In
- Page 232 and 233:
Ineffective reporting tools also ma
- Page 234 and 235:
On the last day of the audit, the a
- Page 236 and 237:
Marketing was apparently told eithe
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CORRECTION OF IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCI
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Cherry Point audit reports.2005.The
- Page 242 and 243:
Although the reviews referenced abo
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BP’s response to the Whiting rupt
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BP’s response to other major proc
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to confirm the application of lesso
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Assessing performance of the proces
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The same reports indicate that issu
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The focus of the assessment, which
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BOARD OVERSIGHT> Panel’s review r
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Panel conclusionThe Panel notes tha
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20 See ibid, p. 2; International La
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investigated to determine the root
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111 Indiana Department of Labor, In
- Page 267 and 268:
VII. PANEL’S RECOMMENDATIONSThe P
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RECOMMENDATION #2—INTEGRATED AND
- Page 271 and 272:
RECOMMENDATION #3—PROCESS SAFETY
- Page 273 and 274:
RECOMMENDATION #4—PROCESS SAFETY
- Page 275 and 276:
RECOMMENDATION #5—CLEARLY DEFINED
- Page 277 and 278:
RECOMMENDATION #7—LEADING AND LAG
- Page 279 and 280:
RECOMMENDATION #8—PROCESS SAFETY
- Page 281 and 282:
RECOMMENDATION #10—INDUSTRY LEADE
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a ground fault on electrical heat t
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In response to the Urgent Recommend
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APPENDIX BU.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND
- Page 289:
2. Ensure that, at a minimum, the p
- Page 293:
ChairmanBP AmericaRobert MaloneVP S
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As a result of the failure to isola
- Page 298 and 299:
IV. The BP Rupture Disk Report’s
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APPENDIX ETECHNICAL CONSULTANTS’R
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Disclaimer NoticeABSG Consulting In
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Based on the Scope of Work, the PSM
- Page 308 and 309:
efineries had an effective and cred
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List of TablesNumberPage2.1 PSM Rev
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2. Technical Approach and Project T
- Page 314 and 315:
2.3 Review Process2.3.1 Carson, Che
- Page 316 and 317:
Table 2.1 - PSM Review Team, Techni
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Table 3.1 - Summary of System Findi
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elief system. All five refineries h
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More than 20 process pipe rack stru
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PCMS to 8 years, the refinery faile
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Notwithstanding BP’s prior implem
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Based upon their sampling done at e
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System Finding 7 - Action item comp
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judgment of the PSM Review Team, se
- Page 334 and 335:
potential consequences of near miss
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4. Overall ConclusionsEach of these
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e. Mechanical integrity and mainten
- Page 340 and 341:
3. Understanding and recognition of
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Walter F. FrankMr. Frank has more t
- Page 344 and 345:
Appendix C - References1 John Mogfo
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APPENDIX FBP POST-TEXAS CITY MEASUR
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Maintenance operating model and han
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3. Corporate-level measuresBoard of
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BP U.S. RefineriesIndependent Safet
- Page 357 and 358:
Have you viewed the survey introduc
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6. WHAT IS YOUR HERITAGE COMPANY?01
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II. MY OPINIONS AND COMMENTSPlease
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Supervisory Involvement and Support
- Page 365 and 366:
Worker Professionalism / Empowermen
- Page 367 and 368:
III. FINAL COMMENTSPlease provide a
- Page 369 and 370:
APPENDIX HGLOSSARY OF SELECTED TERM
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TermProcess Safety Functional Group