The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

the facility siting risk to personnel. Specifically, the technical consultants identified some permanent buildings at all five refineries that areinside hazard zones and that were not designed to effectively protect the buildings’ occupants in the event of an explosion.In recognition of the hazard associated with potential explosions, the refineries had relocated control rooms into new structures that were eitherlocated some distance from the refining process area or designed to be blast resistant. These control rooms are staffed with process boardoperators, refinery operation supervisors, and engineers.However, some outside operating and maintenance personnel in some units still use offices in the original control rooms that remain in theprocess areas. Because buildings such as these were not designed to withstand explosions, the technical consultants consider it a goodpractice to restrict their use even by essential operating personnel. The technical consultants recognized that BP has taken steps to securesome buildings and to prevent their use, but based on the site visits that the consultants made, it appears that these steps are not alwayseffective.The technical consultants noted in their report to the Panel that the Cherry Point, Texas City, and Toledo refineries are making a substantialeffort to replace these process area operator shelters with blast-resistant structures. However, the consultants also noted that it appeared thatit would be several years before BP completed this activity at all five of its U.S. refineries. The consultants also indicated that in theirprofessional judgment, the pace at which these situations are being corrected is too slow.Finding:BP’s safety management system does not ensure timely implementation of external good engineeringpractices that support and could improve process safety performance at BP’s five U.S. refineries.Process Safety Management Systems C 148