The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

82 When conducting reviews, BP designates a finding as either Priority 1 or Priority 2. BP defines a Priority 1 finding as “a compliance gap andresolution is critical to delivering [the refinery’s] PSM and RMP performance targets.” Priority 2 findings, on the other hand, “reflect anopportunity and resolution is important to the on-going integrity or continuous improvement of [the refinery’s] PSM and RMP processes.”83 BP’s plan requires BP’s operational leadership to commit to six expectations. In addition to “audit finding closure,” these expectationsinclude completing the “Texas City commitments,” conducting and taking action on major accident risk assessments, implementing the newcontrol of work and integrity management Group standards, ensuring complete compliance with relevant laws and regulations, and ensuringcompetence in matters of safety and operations.84 American Industrial Hygiene Association, American National Standard for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, ANSI/AIHAZ10-2005 (Fairfax, Virginia: American Industrial Hygiene Association, 2005), p. iii.85 Ibid, pp. 20-21. Other well-recognized authorities on safety management systems similarly stress the correction of identified deficiencies.See International Labour Office—Geneva, Guidelines on occupational safety and health management systems, ILO-OSH 2001 (2001), pp.15-17.86 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(e)(5) (2006) (emphasis added).87 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.119(m)(5), (o)(4) (2006).88 BP p.l.c., “getting HSE right: a guide for BP managers,” (December 2002), p. 4.89 Ibid, p. 22 (emphasis in original).90 Ibid, p. 21.91 Ibid.92 Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents (New York: American Institute of ChemicalEngineers, 2d ed. 2003), p. 305 (emphasis in original).93 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(o)(1) (2006).94 The 1998 audit occurred when the refinery was still owned by Amoco. It also should be noted that the 2004 review was of the BP SouthHouston complex, which at the time included not just the Texas City refinery, but also chemical manufacturing facilities in the Texas City andHouston areas.95 Exact figures were not provided. The report only notes that these types of equipment are 90.6 percent to 99.8 percent compliant.96 BP p.l.c., “getting HSE right: a guide for BP managers,” (December 2002), p. 22.97 Ibid.98 The report includes gHSEr audits conducted across the BP Group, including 13 business units in the Refining and Marketing segment.99 The audit was conducted within three of the segment’s strategic performance units, including Refining. Included among the visited siteswere the Carson and Cherry Point refineries.100 BP p.l.c., James W. Stanley, “Process and Operational Audit Report, BP Texas City,” June 15, 2005, p. 3.101 Ibid, p.13.102 Ibid.103 On May 16, 2006, BP filed a notice of contest challenging the citations.104 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Citation and Notification of Penalty, April 24, 2006, p. 5.105 Ibid, p.8.106 Ibid, p. 24.107 Ibid, p.7.108 Ibid, pp. 13-23.109 Ibid, pp. 15-23.110 Ibid, pp. 5-6, 12.Performance Evaluation, Corrective Action, and Corporate Oversight C 239