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The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

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Information relating to BP’s Texas City refinery clearly demonstrates prior deficiencies in resources for training. For example, the Texas Cityrefinery performed a gap analysis against the new integrity management standard indicating that the refinery had insufficient resourcesdedicated to training. <strong>The</strong> Mogford <strong>Report</strong> states that at Texas City, the “[s]pending level and headcount [for the refinery’s Learning &Development Department] peaked in 1998 ....” 49 <strong>The</strong> same report shows the following training budget and declining headcount for the period1997-2005.YearTable 45Learning and Development Department Training Budget (Texas City)Actual Spending$000Resource AllocationFull Time Employees1997 1,728.40 301998 2,847.90 281999 1,114.47 212000 1,413.51 ¿17.52001 1,250.75 ¿11.52002 1,111.76 102003 1,220.30 92004 1,429.70 82005 1,700.00* 9* Budgeted amountAlthough the <strong>Panel</strong> requested this type of information for the other refineries, BP was not able to provide it in the same form or in the same levelof detail.In 2003, BP conducted an operator competency assurance model audit at Toledo. While some bright spots were found, the audit concluded thattraining at Toledo was “reactive instead of proactive” and that there was a failure to establish and maintain a training department becausethere were “no well-defined comprehensive training plans/budgets/resources.”Additionally, hourly, supervisory, and managerial-level refinery employees commonly commented about insufficient resources dedicated tosafety training. For example, operators, managers, and training coordinators said that BP did not provide enough trainers to assure that alloperators received the requisite level of training to operate safely. <strong>The</strong> 2003 operator competency assurance model audit at Toledo found aninsufficient number of training coordinators at the refinery.Both the Stanley <strong>Report</strong> and the Mogford <strong>Report</strong> discuss evidence indicating that training personnel at Texas City were not spending sufficienttime actually engaged in training activities. <strong>The</strong> Stanley <strong>Report</strong> states that unit trainers were expected to spend 85 to 90 percent of their timeon unit training needs, but were in fact only spending 30 to 80 percent of their time on training activities. 50 Likewise, the Mogford <strong>Report</strong> foundthat one unit training coordinator only spent approximately 5 percent of his time on training activities and that the site average was onlyestimated to be about 30 percent. 51 Process Safety Management Systems C 156

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