The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

its staff, or its technical consultants with certain examples of these documents or oral briefings covering the substance of these documents ina manner that allowed the Panel to obtain the information needed to accomplish its objectives.Additionally, BP did not provide the Panel with privileged documents, a limited number of documents that BP characterized as sensitive, andcertain email. While the Panel’s staff had no means to challenge BP’s assertion of the attorney-client privilege, the Panel’s staff also had nobasis to believe that BP lacked legitimate grounds for claiming the privilege. BP did not produce a small number of documents on the groundsof sensitivity. However, the substance of some of these documents—consisting largely of compensation, financial, budgetary, commercial, andcompetitive matters—was communicated to the Panel’s staff through various means, including oral briefings. Additionally, the Panel’s staffdetermined the information contained in some of these types of documents was not relevant to the Panel’s review. While BP produced variousemails to the Panel, a general forensic email search was not conducted in connection with the Panel’s document requests.During the course of the Panel’s review, BP produced, and the Panel and its staff examined, approximately 25,000 pages of documents relatedto the Carson refinery; 24,000 pages of documents related to the Cherry Point refinery; 175,000 pages of documents related to the Texas Cityrefinery; 43,000 pages of documents related to the Toledo refinery; 30,000 pages of documents related to the Whiting refinery; and 44,000 pagesof documents from BP’s corporate offices. In addition, BP produced to the Panel and its staff all of the documents that BP produced to theplaintiffs in the Texas City civil litigation.In addition to requests for documents, the Panel periodically asked BP for written briefings on a variety of topics, as well as for writtenresponses to targeted requests for information. BP informed the Panel that some of the requests called for data that BP did not routinelymaintain or track in the manner or at the level of detail that the Panel had requested. For example, headcounts of particular types of workerswith process safety responsibilities or budgets for process safety-related expenditures generally were not available. BP advised the Panel thatsuch information typically was aggregated with more general information that included environmental or other non-process safety-relatedinformation. The Panel believes that BP’s briefings and responses to information requests were of great assistance.The Panel appreciates the effort that BP made to identify, locate, and produce requested documents. Although the Panel did not receive all thedocuments it requested, the Panel does not doubt that BP acted in good faith.MEETINGS WITH OTHER COMPANIES ABOUT PROCESS SAFETYIn conducting the review that its charter contemplated, the Panel believed it important to consider the manner in which other companiesengaged in the energy, chemical, and other process industries manage process safety performance and attempt to cultivate a strong processsafety culture. For this reason, the Panel talked with several current and former employees with responsibility for health and safety at a varietyof large public companies of this type. The Panel believes that these discussions provided it with a valuable perspective as it reviewed variousaspects of BP’s refinery operations.B. Qualifications and LimitationsPURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE PANEL’S REVIEWThe Panel’s charter directs it to make a thorough, independent, and credible assessment of the effectiveness of BP’s corporate oversight ofsafety management systems at its five U.S. refineries and its corporate safety culture. The charter further directs the Panel to produce a reportexamining and recommending needed improvements to BP’s corporate safety oversight, corporate safety culture, and corporate and site safetyThe Panel’s Review C 12