The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

Table 32“The training that I have receiveddoes not provide me with a clearunderstanding of the processsafety risks at my refinery.”Texas City GroupPercentages of Agree/Tend toAgree ResponsesMaintenance/Craft Technicians 42Contractors 39Operators 35Maintenance Management 26Engineering Professionals 20Full-Time HSSE Employees 17Operations Management 17The Panel believes that the survey responses reflect a need for continued cultural change at Texas City and that interviews convey uncertaintyabout whether the improvements that so many perceived with respect to the refinery’s start-up will be temporary or permanent. As one seniormanager in Texas City recently stated, “Now the culture is changing, but it needs to be sustained. If we were to stop now, the old culture wouldbe more prevalent in six months.” 56Toledo process safety culture. The Toledo refinery, which BP has owned far longer than the other four U.S. refineries, has a weak safetyculture. The refinery has a history of poor communications; distrust between management, the union, and contractors; and significantmanagement turnover. Toledo’s unionized hourly workers have poor morale and are generally far more pessimistic than Toledo’s managementabout the refinery. That being said, Toledo’s management generally is more negative than management at the other refineries about issuesconcerning process safety culture.BP’s own assessments of Toledo reflect the refinery’s significant process safety culture weaknesses. An October 2002 gHSEr audit of Toledofound that a “strong perception of production and cost over safety” existed, that “leaders do not actively encourage reporting of all incidentsand employees noted reluctance or even feel discouraged to report some HSE incidents,” and that a heavy reliance was placed upon experienceand knowledge, not systems and procedures.A third-party consulting firm authored an assessment of Toledo in June 2004 and made the following conclusions: “Safety, as a value, does not exist in and throughout the leadership and the organization.” “Consistently, cost and production are said to override safety concerns.” “The poor relationship between the union and management must be addressed.” “There is significant individual cynicism within the refinery; this individual cynicism is extensive and promotes an organizationalcynicism. The industry has said safety is number one for years, when it really was not and the workforce knew it.”The assessment noted that these problems and issues were very deeply rooted. While observing that many commended the then-plant managerfor her focus on safety, the assessment added that many “remained cynical as to whether or not [the plant manager] can overcome years ofcost cutting, production push, management turnover, lack of continuity, and unsafe work habits that had eclipsed the refinery environment.”The consulting firm’s assessment went on to discuss Toledo’s “toleran[ce] of non-conforming behaviors” at all levels of the refinery, bad moraleand apathy, hostility between the unionized workforce and management, and a lack of accountability or consequences for noncompliance.Corporate Safety Culture C 113