The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

BP has not yet established formal training programs for these management levels. In 2005, BP’s U.S. Refining leadership team determined thatattrition and changing demographics were affecting the superintendent ranks within the refineries, and BP initiated a pilot training program atits Whiting refinery to address these problems. To date, BP’s pilot superintendent training program has not been expanded to the otherU.S. refineries. 26BP also uses “step-up” supervisors. During turnarounds or periods of heavy supervisor vacation, BP occasionally needs additional supervisors.At those times, BP hourly employees may be “stepped up” into supervisory positions for a defined period of time. They receive no training for thisposition, and they report to permanent supervisors while working in that capacity.Beneath the first level leaders are the BP hourly employees, who are typically operators and maintenance personnel. All BP hourly employeesparticipate in the VPP. At all of the U.S. refineries except Cherry Point, the BP hourly employees are members of the USW and are subject to acollective bargaining agreement.FUNCTIONS INFLUENCING PROCESS SAFETYBP states that accountability for process safety, like accountability for virtually all other aspects of the refineries’ operations, remains with theline, starting with the Group Chief Executive and running down the line to the refinery plant managers and below. However, a variety offunctions outside of the line influence process safety.> Safety and operationsPrior to the March 2005 Texas City accident, BP had a Group HSSE function that reported to the Executive Officer, Strategic Functions. From2000 to 2002, John Mogford was the head of HSSE. Before taking that position, Mogford essentially had spent his entire career in BP’sExploration and Production segment.From 2002 until 2005, Greg Coleman was the Group Vice-President, HSSE. Like Mogford, Coleman’s background was in Exploration andProduction. During this period, Coleman and the head of Group Technology had an understanding that responsibility for process safety fitwithin Group Technology, not HSSE. Consequently, prior to 2005, responsibility for supporting health, personal safety, security, and environmentat BP fell under the HSSE function, while responsibility for supporting process safety (sometimes referred to within BP as “safety engineering”)fell under Group Technology.As a result of its investigation into the March 2005 Texas City accident, BP concluded that it needed to elevate the profile and importance ofsafety and operations within the company (with “operations” effectively meaning “management of hydrocarbons”). Mogford, who headed BP’sinvestigation at Texas City, made this recommendation because he believed that BP’s issues related more to operations than traditional HSSEand that “safety” had become associated more with personal safety than major risk management.Following the release of BP’s interim investigation report on the Texas City incident, BP announced the creation of a new Group-level function,Safety and Operations, with Mogford, who is based in London, as its head. Mogford’s title is Senior Group Vice-President, Safety and Operations.As Senior Group Vice-President, Mogford is positioned one level below an Executive Vice-President, such as Manzoni. In this new position,Mogford reports directly to the Group Chief Executive (Browne) and is a member of the Group Chief Executive team. Mogford also reportsindirectly to the Executive Officer, Strategic Resources. Mogford has attended nearly every meeting of the EEAC held since the establishment ofthe Safety and Operations function.Overview of BP’s Organizational Structure and Its Five U.S. Refineries C 36