The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

BP’S PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMBP appears to have established a relatively effective personal safety management system by embedding personal safety aspirations andexpectations within the U.S. refining workforce. BP has not been effective in implementing across all of its U.S. refineries the aspirationalguidelines and expectations articulated in its gHSEr management system framework, its 2001 process safety/integrity management standard,and other Group-level guidance relating to process risks. In addition to the results from the reviews that the Panel’s technical consultantsconducted and the results from the process safety culture survey as discussed above in this section, the Panel’s review of BP’s internal auditreports and other information further support the Panel’s finding that BP has not implemented an integrated, comprehensive, and effectiveprocess safety management system for its U.S. refineries.> 2003 gHSEr audit reportThe 2003 gHSEr audit outlines key issues found across 35 gHSEr audits conducted across BP’s business segments and one functional group.The purpose of this report was to highlight common and systemic findings from these audits, especially those in which root cause may warrantfocus at the BP Group or segment level so that the safety management system could be improved. The report indicates that while most entitiesaudited had a significant number of processes in place to manage safety performance, a number of common themes emerge, “largely relatedto behaviours, implementation, and follow through which have already impacted HSE delivery and will continue to impact future performanceuntil improvement is well-established.” According to this report, the most significant of these common themes include widespread tolerance of noncompliance with basic HSE rules, poor implementation of HSE Management Systems, reducing the effectiveness and efficiency of activities to manage HSE risks anddeliver sustainable performance, lack of leadership competence and understanding to effectively manage all aspects of HSE, and insufficient monitoring of key HSE processes to provide management visibility and confidence in their ability to deliver as requiredand any intervention needed.In addition, this report contains a section captioned “Actions which could address these gaps.” These action items include a need for greater clarity on what constitutes an HSSE management system and a plant manager’s accountability forimplementation, a need to look at how to improve competency in all areas of HSSE management either through improving executive knowledge and/orgreater expertise in decentralized deployed HSSE staff to enable them to coach effectively, and a need for greater clarity on HSSE monitoring as part of an HSSE management system including more advice and coaching on how todevelop a robust HSSE monitoring system.> 2004 gHSEr audit reportA BP internal audit report in 2004 outlines key issues found across 29 gHSEr audits conducted across BP, including the Refining and Marketingsegment. This report also supports the Panel’s conclusion that BP did not have an effective process safety management system. For example, thisreport indicates, among other things, that while the implementation of business unit HSSE management systems had improved slightly since2003, concern still existed about the overreliance on key personnel rather than systems. The report also states that[a] root cause of this is believed to be a lack of understanding through the organisation as to what constitutes amanagement system as opposed to operational controls or procedures. Without this understanding it is difficult forleaders to monitor their systems effectively and provide assurance up the line that risks are being managed.Process Safety Management Systems C 174