The Baker Panel Report - ABSA

The Panel recognizes that Browne is a very visible chief executive officer. Browne is generally noted for his leadership in various areas, includingreducing carbon dioxide emissions 6 and developing the use of alternative fuels. 7 During the last eight years, Browne has spoken frequently onthese issues across the globe. 8 In 2005, The Financial Times named him the fifth most respected business leader in the world. Browne’s passionand commitment for climate change is particularly apparent. In hindsight, the Panel believes that if Browne had demonstrated comparableleadership on and commitment to process safety, that leadership and commitment would likely have resulted in a higher level of process safetyperformance in BP’s U.S. refineries. As observed in the 2003 Conference Board report on best practices in corporate safety and health, “[i]f thetop executive believes in the worth of the strategies, sets expectations for other managers, follows through on those expectations, and commitsappropriate resources, shared beliefs, norms, and practices will evolve.” 9The Panel’s review indicates that prior to the Texas City accident, executive management, like BP generally, had been more focused on personalsafety than process safety. For example, the Panel found only a limited number of internal or public statements on process safety that Brownemade, including letters published in the October 2000 and June 2006 editions of Horizon, BP’s in-house magazine. 10 The October 2000 letter,which was written shortly after the Grangemouth incidents, is a general plea for all BP employees to take safety seriously. 11 The June 2006 letterdiscusses the Safety and Operations function and other corporate responses to the lessons learned from the Texas City ISOM accident. 12The Panel recognizes, however, that in his September 2006 interview with the Panel, Browne appeared to demonstrate a markedly differentattitude toward process safety. Browne acknowledged that BP has not been sufficiently clear on process safety, that BP must make processsafety a “key imperative,” and that getting personal and process safety right must be the foundation of the company’s operations. Brownefurther explained the need to reset process safety expectations, establish appropriate process safety metrics and milestones, and strengthenthe process safety capabilities of line management. The Panel notes the evolution of Browne’s articulation of the importance of process safetybetween his first and second interviews with the Panel, 13 as well as his expressed commitment to what he called the “insistent, unfailingpriority of process safety.”The Panel is also aware of several presentations that Browne made in October 2006 to BP employees in town hall meetings in Chicago andSouthern California. The Panel understands that in these meetings Browne conveyed the following messages about process safety: BP, and he, had not been sufficiently passionate about plant safety. BP needed to listen to people better. BP must have a verified system to put in place repeatable operations. BP will add people to operations, supervision, and HSSE. BP personnel must take personal responsibility for safety, “stop and escalate” if in doubt, and not tolerate noncompliance.The Panel believes that if Browne continues to champion these messages, and that if he and other members of BP management reinforce themwith consistent and sustained actions, process safety culture and performance within BP will improve.Demonstrating commitment to process safety through other actions. The Panel believes that in addition to communicating its commitmentto process safety excellence to stakeholders, BP management must demonstrate that commitment through its actions and decisions. The Panelagrees with an observation that Browne made during an interview with the Panel—“90 percent will be what we do, not what we say”—andbelieves that Browne and the rest of BP management must reinforce the message about the importance of process safety with clear andconsistent actions.The Panel understands that neither the Group Chief Executive nor the Chief Executive, Refining and Marketing has any operating managementresponsibilities with respect to BP’s U.S. refineries. The Panel is not suggesting that either of them should be involved in the day-to-daymanagement of the U.S. refining operations, particularly given the scope and complexity of BP’s global businesses. However, executivemanagement and refining line management above the refinery level have other significant opportunities to affect process safety performanceCorporate Safety Culture C 67