Section 2.5else. Even with a broad international commitment about CO 2emissions, it is temptingfor a nation like <strong>Australia</strong> to “free ride” <strong>and</strong> keep burning coal for its electricity, unlessinternational sanctions <strong>and</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>ns’ moral sense of fair play, dictate otherwise.To decide not to do this, there must be a social <strong>and</strong> environmental justification, tiedto rigorous energy, economic <strong>and</strong> population policy. We can anticipate many of theimpacts of future global warming, <strong>and</strong> we have the ability to make the key economic<strong>and</strong> technological choices required to substantially mitigate emissions. But will we actin time, <strong>and</strong> will it be with sufficient effort, to avoid dangerous climate change?Focusing first on the short-term 2020 goal, the <strong>Australia</strong>n Government’s expectation isthat total national emissions will actually rise from the 2011 figure of 578 Mt of CO 2e to621 Mt by 2020 – a net growth of 7.5 per cent over the next nine years. 19 Yet the goalis five per cent below 2000 levels of 558 Mt, so the target number the government isseeking to reach is 530 Mt. The BAU expectation is 680 Mt, so the newly legislatedcarbon tax <strong>and</strong> other emissions reduction incentives (such as energy efficiency <strong>and</strong>renewable energy certificates) are expected to save about 60 Mt compared with theno policy approach. To fill the 91 Mt gap, Treasury modelling suggests that 15 per centof the 2020 emissions reductions will come from international carbon pollution permitsfrom developing countries, including clean energy projects, avoided deforestation, <strong>and</strong>so on. 20 These are of course difficult to verify, but that is the concept.The heavy reliance on foreign abatement credits to supplement domestic efforts willcontinue through to 2050. In July 2011 the Treasury released new modelling whichlooked at a range of energy scenarios (assuming a mix of energy efficiency <strong>and</strong> conservation,renewable energy <strong>and</strong> fossil fuels, but excluding nuclear) <strong>and</strong> design features ofa carbon pricing scheme. 21 The core policy scenario assumes global action to stabiliseCO 2e at 550 ppm by the year 2100, which aligns with <strong>Australia</strong>’s current emissionsreduction target of 80 per cent by 2050. The energy mix in 40 years is assumed tocontinue with a majority reliance on fossil fuels (black coal, oil <strong>and</strong> natural gas, abouthalf of which makes use of carbon capture <strong>and</strong> storage technology), but with between35 <strong>and</strong> 47 per cent coming from renewables, up from an 11 per cent share today. 22Alternatives: steady or declining <strong>Australia</strong>npopulation?St<strong>and</strong>ard policy analyses on emissions abatement involve the modelling of energy <strong>and</strong>economic growth pathways, <strong>and</strong> a conjecture about future population size. The defaultassumption is that population will continue to grow in the coming decades, with themid-range estimate, as described above, being an increase from 22.7 million people in2011 to 31.3 million in 2050. <strong>Australia</strong>’s total fertility rate is currently 1.78 23 , which is theaverage number of children born to a woman if she were to survive through to the endof her reproductive life. This is below the replacement fertility rate, which for <strong>Australia</strong>(with a low mortality rate) is a little less than 2.1 24 . Yet <strong>Australia</strong>’s population continuesto grow at a rate of 1.15 per cent per year, due to our substantial net migration rate,recently six migrants per 1000 population. That is, without migration, <strong>Australia</strong>’s populationwould now be contracting, not growing, as is already the case for many OECDnations with lower immigration rates, such as Germany, Italy, France, Sweden, Japan<strong>and</strong> Korea. 26Because <strong>Australia</strong>’s population growth is now determined by migration policy, ourfuture population trajectory is, in theory, “tuneable”, via adjustment of net migrationrates, without any need for recourse to other forms of population control such as incentivesfor fertility reductions. This situation allows us to pose an interesting hypotheticalA <strong>Greater</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>: <strong>Population</strong>, Policies <strong>and</strong> Governance107
Section 2.5question: can population policy be used to effectively mitigate <strong>Australia</strong>’s future greenhousegas emissions?To put this question in a more exact form, assume that future government policy restrictsnet migration rates over the next few decades such that our population peaks at a littlehigher than today, <strong>and</strong> then declines thereafter, reaching a stable population size in2050 of 20 million people (ie, lower than the current size, <strong>and</strong> only 56 per cent of theforecast upper value of 35.9 million). Under this scenario, if projected rates of per capitaproductivity were to hold, despite the changed demographic assumptions, then, underBAU, <strong>Australia</strong>’s emissions would still rise to 780 Mt CO 2e by 2050, an increase of 40per cent over 2000 levels. As a result, a transformation of energy generation systemstowards a predominance of low-carbon technologies, improved energy efficiency <strong>and</strong>conservation, <strong>and</strong>/or lower economic growth, are still required for emissions cuts.Clearly then, an ambitious population policy, operating in isolation, would prove to beinsufficient to curb our greenhouse gas emissions. Demographic impetus means thathuman population size is slow to change, <strong>and</strong> therefore not a particularly effective“lever” for mitigating emissions. One reason for this sluggish momentum is that in<strong>Australia</strong> today, life expectancy is over 80 years, <strong>and</strong> almost 55 per cent of today’spopulation – 12.4 million people – are not yet 40 years old 27 . Thus, in 2050, most ofthese people will still be alive. No fertility or migration policy will alter this fact.What matters most: technology transformationThe challenges to achieving a modern <strong>Australia</strong>n society that is able to protect itsnatural environments <strong>and</strong> mitigate the worst effects of climate change are massive.These problems encompass substantive social, political, <strong>and</strong> economic issues. Howcan <strong>Australia</strong> – with 22.7 million people today <strong>and</strong> a likely larger population in the future– adapt to this changing l<strong>and</strong>scape?One idea, proposed in the early 1970s, is to adopt a “small is beautiful” philosophy<strong>and</strong> deploy appropriate technologies that are relatively simple <strong>and</strong> work on only localscales, but might eventually achieve a large bottom-up shift towards sustainability. 28A related approach is to advocate for fundamental behavioural change in society. Yetthis has patently not happened to date, <strong>and</strong> it remains difficult to envisage how anycollective society would initiate such change, <strong>and</strong> then pursue it at sufficient pace <strong>and</strong>on a gr<strong>and</strong> enough scale to make a difference, while at the same time upholding thedemocratic <strong>and</strong> liberal freedoms that <strong>Australia</strong>ns cherish.The alternative is to seek shortcuts that can drive a more rapid transformation, basedon major policy interventions on infrastructure, investment, <strong>and</strong> promotion of technologicaladvances that result in broad-scale benefits to both human society <strong>and</strong> theenvironment. 29 The concept of the “techno-fix” – the idea that social problems aremore quickly <strong>and</strong> efficiently solved via application of technology rather than relying ona multitude of people to act rationally – is alien or anathema to most environmentalists,perhaps because it involves engagement with the neo-classical economic ideas ofcontroversial environmental commentators like Simon 30 <strong>and</strong> Lomborg 31 .Yet in a way, the recent analysis of <strong>Australia</strong>’s future carbon emissions abatement pathwaysby the Treasury 32 can be seen as an endorsement of the pursuit of techno-fixes. Inthis case, a pathway for energy transformation was defined, <strong>and</strong> various technologiesfor low-carbon electricity generation were evaluated on the basis of their fit-for-servicematurity, economic competitiveness <strong>and</strong> scalability. Indeed, most of the technologiesthat are postulated to be providing energy to a “large <strong>Australia</strong>” in 2050 are not yetA <strong>Greater</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>: <strong>Population</strong>, Policies <strong>and</strong> Governance108
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A Greater Australia:Population, pol
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ContentsForeword CEDA Chief Executi
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ForewordIt is with pleasure that I
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IntroductionResponding to the resul
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IntroductionA more dynamic and vita
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IntroductionSustainabilityConcern a
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IntroductionThe new demographics, h
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Section 1.0Historical perspectives1
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Section 1.1IntroductionJapan’s cr
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Section 1.1Figure 1Forecast number
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Section 1.1Table 1Defence spending
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Section 1.1How much defence is enou
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Section 1.1ConclusionA substantial
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Section 1.2There has been over a ce
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Section 1.2Resource constraints wer
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Section 1.2Similarly, in the 1994 H
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Section 1.2ReferencesAustralia, Dep
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Section 1.3IntroductionAustralia is
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Section 1.3The grey 90sThe heady ex
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Section 1.3Taylor’s stony rebutta
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Section 1.3Figure 1The Benhamite Op
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Section 1.3In mathematical terms, t
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Section 1.3characterisation of the
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Section 1.3ConclusionA retrospectiv
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Section 2.0Population futures2.1 Fo
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Section 2.1Conventional population
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Section 2.1It is more useful for go
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Section 2.1Forecasting of births, w
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Section 3.3case, funding also could
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Section 3.3Endnotes1 IGR 2010: Chal
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3.4Healthcare delivery for our agei
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Section 3.4• Private medical serv
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Section 3.4the whole spectrum of in
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Section 3.45. Experiences, pathways
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Section 3.4Stratification of patien
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Section 3.4Other steps include impr
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Section 3.438 National Health Refor
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4.1The economic effects ofpopulatio
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Section 4.1population growth can ex
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Section 4.1In theory, the answer pa
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Section 4.1Kirchner concedes that t
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Section 4.1Endnotes1. Productivity
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4.2Urban infrastructure and land us
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Section 4.2bearing the fixed costs
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Section 4.2Figure 1Indicative dwell
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Section 4.2Taking the electricity,
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Section 4.2Promoting better land us
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Section 4.2preferences to homeowner
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Section 4.2in any Australian urban
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Section 4.2Endnotes1 Productivity C
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4.3Water security:Water for the far
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Section 4.3Water trading enables us
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Section 4.3cent of water entitlemen
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Section 4.3were either the full eco
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Section 4.3Strategic opportunitiesA
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4.4Critiquing governmentregional de
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Section 4.4However, there is often
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Section 4.4Potential policy interve
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Section 4.4Unfortunately, advocacy
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Section 4.4contribute substantially
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Section 4.418 Department of Educati
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5.1The future of population policyG
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Section 5.1a million fewer women in
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Section 5.1For the present, ongoing
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Section 5.1The second worry is that
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Section 5.1The now significantly de