A Greater Australia: Population, policies and governance - CEDA

Section 1.1been the advent of nuclear weapons. For more than 60 years, no two nuclear armedpowers have fought a major conflict. If the specter of nuclear armageddon could keepthe United States and the Soviet Union at arm’s length despite deep district and fundamentallyincompatible interests, surely peace with China can be maintained. This isall the more plausible given that China is tightly integrated into the international system,whereas the Soviets were economically and politically isolated.What can almost certainly be discounted, because it would be profoundly senseless,is that China will ever renounce global economic engagement and emulate Japan’sbehaviour in the 1930s and 1940s. However, ultimately there can be no guaranteethat China and the United States will be smart enough to avoid a clash of arms oversomething more minor, and the fact they are preparing the wherewithal to do so doesnot bode well. 22 If a conflict were to occur, it would be short, sharp and potentiallycatastrophic. Hopefully the more likely worst-case outcome is a “warm peace” builtaround a strategic stalemate. 23At this point the argument for stronger defence is looking plausible; China’s rise cannotbe dismissed and the possibility of war cannot be discounted. Yet the third and finalargument against a redoubling of our defence effort argues to the contrary. Put simply,it is beyond Australia’s capacity to shape the course of Asian strategic affairs by theuse of armed force in all but a limited set of special circumstances, irrespective of anycredible boost to our economic capacity.Whatever additional military capability we might be able to muster would only tip theconventional balance of power temporarily in favour of the United States as Chinacontinues to grow. To put things in perspective, according to the Pentagon, Chinesedefence spending increased by more than the entire Australian Defence budget in thethree years between 2006 and 2009. 24 With the Chinese budget compounding at eightto 10 per cent per annum the potential for Australia to make a difference will rapidlydiminish in the years ahead. Like it or not, we have about as much chance of shapingthe strategic destiny of Asia in the twentieth-first century as Denmark did in Europe inthe 1930s.As for Australia standing alone against China after the United States has decamped forHawaii just as Britain decamped west of Suez, the circumstances where this would befeasible are limited. No doubt there could emerge a situation where China had somelimited interests that it could be persuaded to abandon due to the additional costs wecould impose on them militarily (assuming a face-saving solution was available). But ifarmed conflict is afoot, China would have to be pursuing interests of very substantialimportance to start with – why else would they invite international approbation and acostly disruption of trade to threaten us with force?But what if there was a complete breakdown of international norms and China beganto emulate Japan of the 1940s? Because China has nuclear weapons, any notion ofrefighting the battle of the Coral Sea is fanciful – and not within our capacity anyway. By2050, China is forecast to have an economy 20 times larger than Australia’s, 25 and noplausible program of accelerated population growth can redress that imbalance. If USprotection was absent, China could take their time and do whatever they want to us.If this extreme scenario is to be taken seriously (it probably should not) the only courseof action would be a nuclear weapons program.A Greater Australia: Population, Policies and Governance24