- arrivals: a recent estimation is that only nine percent of people arriving at Bujumbura’sinternational airport were leisure tourists in 2009-2010 (compared to 52 % for business purposesand 19 % to visit relatives), representing 5,000 people (Republic of Burundi 2011a).- private sector: the sectoral chamber of tourism and hotels (part of the Federal Chamber ofCommerce and Industry – CFCIB) had a membership of only 75 operators at the end of 2010(restaurants, hotels, travel agencies, etc.) (Republic of Burundi 2011a).ohotels: there are around a hundred hotels, the vast majority of which are located inBujumbura. Together, they offer a total of around 1,700 rooms (Republic of Burundi 2011a).While the State has historically been in the hotel business through ownership in a few largehotels in Bujumbura, a divestiture process has recently been initiated and severalprivatizations are underway or planned. Most hotels in Bujumbura and the fewestablishments outside the capital are small and do not conform to international standards.However, a new dynamic seems to be underway and, according to the Investment PromotionAgency, the hotel and tourism sector received around USD 150 million in investmentprojects in 2010/11(API 2011). For example, Opulent (B) Ltd (Hotel company) signed on4th November 2011, a loan agreement of US $5.5 million with IFC to develop the firstDoubleTree by Hilton Hotel in Burundi 114 . The hotel will help improve the country’sessential business infrastructure by providing international-standard rooms and conferencefacilities. This is also expected to stimulate a range of indirect jobs and SMEs to providegoods and services to the hotel and its clients.o tour operators: around half a dozen of tour operators are established in Bujumbura,employing a total of less than 40 people. Since the end of the conflict, tour operators haveproposed regional circuits, principally for local clients and expatriates, and are <strong>report</strong>edlymore and more working in networks with foreign partners (Republic of Burundi 2011a).- jobs: estimations of the number of jobs directly generated by the tourism industry so far arebetween 1,000 and 1,500, mainly in the hotel business (OTF 2008, Republic of Burundi 2011a).3.2 The weak institutional and regulatory framework for tourismThe institutional framework for tourism in Burundi suffers from a lack of capacity and resources.The tourism sector is under the authority of the Ministry of Trade, Industry, Posts and Tourism. Thehuman and financial resources allocated for the administration of tourism in this ministry are verylimited. Comparatively, the National Tourism Office (ONT) appears in a better position to promote thesector, but also suffers from poor visibility, limited budget for promotion activities, and inadequatedialogue with private actors involved in tourism activities (Republic of Burundi 2011a).The sector’s relevant legislation largely dates from the 1950s-60s and is considered inadequate. Inaddition to the general texts regulating economic activity, the main document specifically regulating thesector is a 1955 ordinance on the operations of hotels, restaurants and bars, which chiefly requires theseestablishments to obtain an annual license to operate. Normative rules, for example on roomcharacteristics or hygiene, have not been applied due to the absence of effective supervision (Republic ofBurundi 2011a). Technical assistance to modernize the sector’s regulatory environment has recentlybeen provided to the Burundian authorities by development partners (UNDP, TradeCom), and severaldraft laws and regulations have been prepared (Law on Tourism and various regulations and applicationtexts). The IFC started to provide further support to the Government and the Private sector to improve114 IFC’s investment will specifically support the renovation and rebranding of the former 106-room Novotel Hoteland transform it into a 4-star international standard, 138-room DoubleTree Hotel by Hilton, employing 155 staff.See: www.ifc.org/IFCExt/Pressroom/IFCPressRoom.nsf/0/52ADA0F3741BB71C8525793E0066C362136 / 153
the attractiveness of the sector for investors, through the Burundi Investment Climate Reform Programlaunched in 2010.Burundi does not impose barriers to trade in tourism services, which should facilitate the entry offoreign actors. Tourism (including hotels, restaurants, tours operators, guides, etc.) is one of the servicesectors for which Burundi has committed not to impose any trade restrictions on mode 1 (cross-bordersupply), 2 (consumption abroad), and 3 (commercial presence) under the WTO’s GATS, the EAC’sschedule and provisional COMESA schedule on the progressive liberalization of services (i.e.commitment schedules specifying “none” for these three modes of supply). Mode 4 (presence of naturalpersons) is unbound (i.e. no commitment made), except for managers and specialized seniormanagement under the GATS commitments, for which a renewable 90-day visa can be delivered. Inpractice, no specific market access or national treatment barriers seem to be currently imposed againstforeign actors (TradeCom Facility 2011), and the main issue, as far as regulation is concerned, is theoverall weakness of sector’s domestic regulations and institutional framework.3.3 Burundi’s new commitment to develop tourismThe example of post-conflict countries, such as Mozambique and Rwanda (box 7.2), suggests thattourism, when supported by adequate policies and liberalization efforts, can attract FDI andcontribute to economic recovery 115 . While no such pattern has been observed in Burundi so far,strengthening the sector has become an important long-term development objective of the Government(e.g. the Government’s “Vision 2025”), who sees tourism as a way to create jobs, diversify exports andobtain foreign currency. To this end, a comprehensive “National Strategy for the SustainableDevelopment of Tourism” (SNDDT) was launched in September 2011 (Republic of Burundi 2011a).This strategy, developed with support from the UNDP, presents the sector, describes its regulatory andinstitutional framework, and suggests ways to strengthen it over the next decade (cf. box 7.3 below).Box 7.2: Post-conflict tourism development, the examples of Rwanda and MozambiqueTourism development in post-conflict countries involves a unique set of challenges. Nevertheless, whensuccessful, tourism can be a tool for peace building, poverty alleviation and infrastructure investment. Itcan also improve the image of the country as an investment destination. Rwanda and Mozambique aretwo examples of post-conflict countries which managed to develop tourism and attract foreigninvestment in the sector, contributing to economic recovery.Mozambique: marked by a history of conflict since the 1960s, Mozambique was in the early 1990s oneof the poorest countries in the world, with extremely weak infrastructure and human resources. Althoughtourism was well-developed in the colonial period, it collapsed with the independence and civil wars. Inthe post-war period, the Government devised a strategy with the World Tourism Organization topromote tourism, which was based on the development of both high end facilities for internationaltourists and medium end infrastructure for regional visitors. Legislative reform and the removal of visasfor visitors from SADC countries are also credited as important drivers of success. In the five yearsfollowing the conflict, the sector received significant amounts of FDI and foreign firms contributed tojob creation. Moreover, marginalized regions also benefited from a new dynamism thanks to investmentsin tourism. The growth of tourism has been sustained in the recent period, and international touristarrivals grew by 284 % between 2005 and 2010 (the government expects four million tourists annuallyby 2025).Rwanda: after it had been severely affected by the 1994 genocide, Rwanda managed to improve itsinternational image and is now considered one of the safest destinations for tourists in Africa. Thisrebranding has principally gone hand in hand with the revival of gorilla tourism. Rwanda’s strategy has115 The argument that tourism can contribute to post-conflict recovery is developed in Novelli et al. (2012).137 / 153
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Currency equivalent(Exchange rate a
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