penetrate these markets are extensively discussed in numerous <strong>report</strong>s, such as World Bank (2008;2011a; 2011c) and USAID (2008). Most recent donor-funded projects targeting the coffee sector haveprovided support and capacity building to actors involved in specialty coffee market segment. Furthersupport that focuses on the development of sustainable production methods, certification, marketing andpromotion of direct sales, etc. can be expected in the coming years to continue (see Annex 3). ARFIC,InterCafé and the CNAC/producer associations need to coordinate these activities. Additional lessonscan be drawn from the successful experience of other countries (Box 3.2).Box 3.2: selected countries’ experiences with coffee sector reformSeveral countries in East Africa and elsewhere have preceded Burundi in reforming their coffee sector,with varying degrees of success. Rwanda and Ethiopia have successfully implemented coffee reformsthat facilitated entry on specialty markets.In Rwanda, as in Burundi, coffee is a major export product. The State has historically been heavilyinvolved in the coffee sector, and elites have extracted large amounts of rents from coffee growers. Aftera decade of rapidly declining quantitative and qualitative performance, reforms supported at the highestpolitical level were initiated in 1998, and led to a rapid transformation of the sector. The governmentliberalized coffee processing, marketing and exports, and improved incentives for farmers and theprivate sector to invest in coffee production. In addition to opening to private sector competition, astrong emphasis was put on improving the coffee value chain and producing specialty coffee (in 2000,90 percent of Rwandan coffee was classified as low-quality ordinary coffee, notably due to the lowincentives to produce quality coffee and the absence of CWSs in the country). This objective, supportedby donors such as the USAID’s PEARL project, led to the strengthening of producer cooperatives, theconstruction of numerous CWSs (mostly by private investors, but also by coffee growers), theimprovement of quality control throughout the industry, and successful image building. This sponsoredinitiative met with success and inspired the private sector to produce and market specialty coffee.As a result, Rwanda has made a remarked entry on specialty markets in the 2000s: the total value ofspecialty coffee exported increased from $ 0.1 million in 2002 to $ 11.6 million in 2009. The country hasorganized Cup of Excellence competitions since 2008, and the winners received prices as high as $20 perpound during the 2011 edition. While these prices remain exceptional, the average income of farmersproducing higher quality coffee has also significantly increased since 2003. However, the quantitativeand qualitative targets initially set for the sector have not been met so far, suggesting that more effortsare needed to consolidate these gains. Challenge remains to increase the production of specialty coffee,including: insufficient production of high quality cherries, calling for better price incentives for farmersand enhanced production techniques; limited efficiency and profitability of CWSs; weak managerialcapacity of producer cooperatives; concerns with Rwanda’s land law; and high transport costs and poorrural transport infrastructure.Ethiopia is believed to be the birthplace of Arabica and is by far the largest coffee producer in Africa(but as opposed to Burundi, half of the production is consumed domestically). While the coffee sectorused to be under tight public control during the Derg military regime, the government started toprogressively liberalize the sector from 1991 onwards. Although reforms were partial and strict controlshave remained in place, these reforms led to an increased participation of private actors along the valuechain, a rise in the share of the export price received by growers, and a positive impact in terms of coffeeproduction and exports. One major progress in 2001 was the authorization given to producercooperatives to sell directly to international buyers, outside the government auction system which wasuntil then mandatory.These cooperatives, organized in unions and supported by donors and NGOs for capacity building, havesince then played a critical role in the development of the value chain, with a focus on quality. Theyenabled Ethiopian coffee grown by small farmers to acquire a significant position on internationalspecialty markets (e.g. high quality, certified or relationship coffee). Between 2001 and 2005, direct64 / 153
sales of specialty coffee by cooperative unions grew from $0.3 million to $ 31.9 million. Thistransformation substantially increased the livelihoods of farmers producing quality coffee, and hascreated incentives for private actors in the sector to advocate in favor of the expansion of the direct salemodel and full liberalization of the sector.In some other countries however, poorly conducted or incomplete reforms have failed to improve theperformances of coffee sectors. Kenya, for example, used to produce high quality coffee in the 1980sand 1990s. The quantity and quality of coffee produced has dramatically declined since then, notablybecause of poor management and corruption in the large cooperatives that controlled production andprocessing. Incomplete reforms have failed to reverse this trend, as coffee processing and marketinghave remained under tight public control, and the value chain has remained plagued by inefficientpractices, insufficient support and incentives to small farmers, and lack of trust between stakeholders.Experience from Cameroon shows that complete withdrawal of government from the coffee sector canalso have detrimental effects, and that government’s role in providing support in the form of regulatoryreform and legal framework, strategic direction, access to extension services and research, is critical forsustainable development of the sector.Source: Dempsey (2006), Petit (2007), International Alert (2007), USAID (2008), World Bank (2005, 2011c), Boudreaux(2011)4. Overcoming supply-side constraints and trade barriers to increase Burundi’s horticultureexportsHorticultural products have been identified in several recent strategic documents adopted by theBurundian government as one of the high-potential sectors for diversification into non-traditionalexports (e.g. first and second PRSPs, 2008 National Agricultural Strategy). The following foodstuffshave been identified as specialty products with high export potential: pineapple, avocado, passion fruit,small bananas, papaya, mango, maracuja, cherimoya, green peas, baby vegetables, leafy greens, selectedroots and tubers, macadamia, flowers and plants. In addition to being an important source of ruralincome and employment creation, the horticulture sector offers great scope for the gradualtransformation from primarily unprocessed products to agro-processing.Horticultural products 78 are currently marginal in Burundi’s formal export basket. Horticultureexports from Burundi, which had progressively gained momentum in the early 1990s, were severely anddurably affected by the subsequent civil war and embargo. Burundi started to export cut flowers in the2000s, but this sector collapsed in 2008 with the global crisis (World Bank 2011b). Nevertheless, tradestatistics suggest that exports of fresh fruits and vegetables have picked up since 2006, principally toBelgium, and have reached almost half a million dollar annually in recent years (Figure 3.6). However,these exports of horticultural products still represented less than one percent of total exports in 2010 79 .78 Burundi’s production of fresh vegetables and fruits were estimated at 403,000 and 102,000 tons respectively in2010 (Source: FAOStat). This production is realized by around 1.4 million smallholder farmers. Product quality aswell as the on-farm mix of products is highly variable and almost always produced in small quantities (Clay et al.2007).79 Official trade statistics do not capture informal flows, and are therefore likely to underestimate the flows of foodproducts exchanged between Burundi and its neighboring country. Cross-border trade in food products is verysignificant in the Great Lakes region, notably towards Eastern DRC (World Bank 2012).65 / 153
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Republic of Burundi / Enhanced Inte
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Currency equivalent(Exchange rate a
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Executive summaryThe Government of
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Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Mombas
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II.3. Unorganized (agricultural) as
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making. Efforts to improve official
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(BIF billion) (%)1. Primary sector
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A striking feature of Burundi’s s
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Business servicesNumber of accounta
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At the same time there exist severa
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Under the capacity building compone
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MadagascarCameroonSenegalKenyaMalaw
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Explaining the Segmentation of Mark
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. Adequate regulations that ensure
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The pace of integration is largely
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take time to overcome, are likely t
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and to domestic travel spending, as
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the attractiveness of the sector fo
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4. The challenges facing tourism in
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supply, hospitals), and in large-sc
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durable improvements in terms of st
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- the introduction of a single EAC
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Box 7.4: Examples of regional conse
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cultural and social sustainability
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ICG. 2012. Burundi: A Deepening Cor
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World Bank. 2010c. Reform and Regio