establishment in 2009 of API with the objective to streamline and increase the efficiency of theinvestments authorization process. According to recent figures, the API had treated 145 investmentprojects between its establishment and the end of 2011, which should amount to BIF 477 billion (aroundUSD 400 million) when completed (API 2011). In 2010/11, the projects treated by the API were mainlyin hotel/tourism (USD 150 million), manufacturing (USD 130 million) and agribusiness (USD 104million).The establishment of the EAC Common Market offers new opportunities in terms of trade inservices and FDI, conditional on the continuation of liberalization and privatization processes andof investment climate reforms. The increased size of the regional market and the possibility to developBurundi as a regional trade hub could create important incentives for foreign investors willing toestablish themselves in the region. Increased FDI would in turn be a major asset to facilitate exportdiversification. For example, the UNCTAD’s review of Burundi’s investment policy highlightssignificant opportunities for FDI in mining, manufactures and services (telecommunications, banking,commercial services, tourism) (UNCTAD 2010).1.4. ConclusionBurundi’s trade performance has historically been poor and the country’s trade profile hasunfortunately not radically evolved over the last decade 19 . Exports are characterized by a high level ofproduct concentration, a strong dependence on primary products and a very low use of technology.Although some efforts have been made to introduce higher-value primary products, these have hadlimited results. Therefore, the main challenges identified in the first <strong>DTIS</strong> remain as pressing as they werein 2004, particularly regarding export diversification.2. What explains Burundi’s poor trade performance in the last decade?Like all landlocked LDC with limited technical and institutional capacities, Burundi faces serious tradepolicy constraints. Numerous policy developments have occurred since the first <strong>DTIS</strong> was conducted in2004, notably due to the increased pace of regional integration in Eastern and Southern Africa, but aseries of trade policy challenges remain.2.1 Despite important liberalization efforts, Burundi’s multilateral and regional integrationefforts are limited by high internal and external trade barriersThe last decade has been marked by significant trade liberalization efforts in Burundi. Burundi’strade regime was for a long time characterized by high tariffs, numerous nontariff barriers (NTBs), arigid system of import and export licenses, and exchange rate controls. The main motivation behind theheavy trade controls was the extraction of economic rents by politically connected individuals(Nkurunziza and Ngaruko 2008). Liberalization efforts launched in 1986 were brought to a halt by thecivil war that affected the country in the 1990s and early 2000s, but have since then significantlyprogressed. Most-favored nation (MFN) liberalization efforts have been complemented with regionalintegration efforts first in the framework of the COMESA and more recently with the EAC (Box 1.2presents Burundi’s main trade policy developments since 2004).Tariffs have been reduced significantly over the last decade. A tariff reform initiated in 2003 hasreduced considerably the average level of protection. However, the system remained opaque andcomplex, with various taxes or charges on imports and exports. Also, there remained “considerable19 In fact, the composition of Burundi’s trade (notably the predominance of coffee exports) has hardly evolvedsince at least the early 1980s, even if there has been some growth in manufactured exports (Milner 2004).26 / 153
scope for both automatic and discretionary exemptions from customs duty” under various legal texts(Milner 2004). Burundi’s 2008 Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) 20 was 12.8 percent based onits MFN tariffs, and 10.1 percent based on the different bilateral tariffs applied to its various partners(OTRI_BE). The wedge between bound and applied tariffs (the overhang), is 54.3 percent (World Bank2010a). As a result of tariff reductions since 2003, the average share of taxes on international trade as aproportion of total tax revenue declined from 23 percent in 2000-2003 to 16 percent in 2007-2010 21 .There remains scope for further tariff reductions. Burundi ranks 102th out of 127 countries on theOTRI_BE variable, where 1 st is the least restrictive. This places Burundi above Uganda (with a rate of7.4 percent), Kenya (8 percent) and Tanzania (9.7 percent), but below Rwanda (11.2 percent). A relatedconcern is the case of “sensitive products” for which tariff peaks persist. For example, Burundi has, likeother member countries, submitted lists of “sensitive products” that should benefit from higher tariffsthan the maximal 25% tariff band of the EAC and COMESA’s CETs, for budgetary or infant industryprotection motives. Products on the EAC’s list include dairy, wheat, maize, sugar, with tariffs rangingbetween 35% and 100% (although a temporary suspension of taxes on basic imported food products wasannounced by the Government in May 2012 to compensate rising food prices, which is intended to lastuntil December). In addition, Burundi has requested that certain products for which there is a domesticproduction be added to the list of sensitive products, such as crown corks (50%), soap (40%), beer(35%), paint (35%) and PVC pipes (35%) (Geourjon and Laporte 2008). This has detrimental impacts onthe level of competition and on prices. The justification for these high tariffs needs to be carefullyreviewed, and alternative ways to enable the Burundian manufacturing sectors to cope with increasedcompetitive pressures need to be explored.Box 1.2: overview of Burundi’s main trade policy developments since 2004Burundi’s multilateral liberalization agendaOne of Burundi’s main objectives in the context of multilateral negotiations remains the improvement ofmarket-access and the reduction of trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture in industrialized countries.However, lack of capacity has continually hampered Burundi’s implementation of its WTOcommitments and limited its participation in negotiations. During the WTO Doha Development Round,Burundi has advocated with the LDC negotiating group for the extension of the Special and DifferentialTreatment regime (SDT) granted to least-developed countries.Burundi’s regional integration agendaBurundi’s integration in the East African Community (EAC) is arguably the country’s mostimportant policy development in the recent period. Burundi joined the EAC’s Customs Union in2009 and subsequently signed with the other members the Common Market protocol, which came intoforce on July 1 st , 2010. Although implementation challenges are vast in all member countries, includingBurundi, this offers Burundi large opportunities for increased trade and investment, improvement of thebusiness environment and structural transformation of the economy. In the coming years, Burundi willtake part in the two final stages of the integration process, first a Monetary Union (expected to beinitiated in 2012) and ultimately a Political Federation. While the EAC is arguably a priority forBurundian authorities, Burundi is nonetheless involved in a number of other regional economic20 The OTRI summarizes the trade policy stance of a country by calculating the uniform tariff that will keep itsoverall imports at the current level when the country in fact has different tariffs for different goods (see Kee, Nicitaand Olarreaga 2010). Dataset accessible at:http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:22951240~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html21 Source : various IMF country <strong>report</strong>s and statistical appendices, 2000-201127 / 153
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Some of the most heavily regulated
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2.2 Severity: the impact of NTMsWhi
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The Central Corridor is potentially
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Air connectivity, while limited in
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Kigoma and Bujumbura lake ports. Th
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In its Strategic Plan 2011-2015, th
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increase reliability would therefor
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8. RecommendationsThe foregoing sho
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Cooperation at the regional level a
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(BIF billion) (%)1. Primary sector
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A striking feature of Burundi’s s
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Business servicesNumber of accounta
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At the same time there exist severa
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Under the capacity building compone
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MadagascarCameroonSenegalKenyaMalaw
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Explaining the Segmentation of Mark
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. Adequate regulations that ensure
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take time to overcome, are likely t
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and to domestic travel spending, as
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the attractiveness of the sector fo
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4. The challenges facing tourism in
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supply, hospitals), and in large-sc
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durable improvements in terms of st
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- the introduction of a single EAC
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Box 7.4: Examples of regional conse
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cultural and social sustainability
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ICG. 2012. Burundi: A Deepening Cor
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World Bank. 2010c. Reform and Regio