Introduction to Cyber-Warfare - Proiect SEMPER FIDELIS

LEVERAGING RESOURCES BEYOND THE MILITARY: THE CYBER WARRIORS OF CHINA121warfare in the late 1990s sought to adapt Chinese military organizations, doctrine, and trainingfor this new form of warfare. Second, Chinese cyber warriors have developed bottom-up.Like many countries, China was home to several communities of hackers. Over the course ofthe first decade of the twenty-first century, leaders in the Chinese military identified some ofthe more talented groups. Since China also developed antihacking laws during this period,the general trend was that the members of these groups became integrated into legitimateentities—including computer security companies, consulting firms, and academia. These entities,in turn, forged close relationships with the Chinese government and military.INEW and Cyber in the PLAThe general information warfare (IW) strategy in use by the PLA is known as IntegratedNetwork Electronic Warfare (INEW). 15 This strategy was originally outlined in a book byGeneral Dai Qingmin in 1999 known as On Information Warfare. This integration of cyber operationsto traditional information warfare assets is a key component of the INEW strategy.INEW relies on simultaneous application of both electronic warfare and cyber operations tooverwhelm an adversary’s command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Hence, the mission of key pieces of cyber warfare (cyberattack, cyber espionage, and cyber defense)—are assigned to elements of the PLA GeneralStaff traditionally given similar roles in electronic warfare.According to a 2009 Northrop Grumman report to the US-China Economic and SecurityReview Commission, the General Staff of the PLA is divided into several departments. INEWgenerally assigns offensive tasks (cyber attack and more conventional electronic counter measures(ECM)) to the 4th Department—which has traditionally played a large role in offensive informationwarfare. Notably, General Dai Qingmin was promoted to the head of the 4thDepartment in 2000—perhaps an indication that the PLA intended to adopt his vision of INEW.Defensive and intelligence tasks—specifically cyber defense and cyber espionage are assigned tothe 3rd Department—which traditionally focused on signal intelligence (SIGINT). It is thoughtthat the 3rd Department is the headquarters for the Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus, whosenormal mission is SIGINT collection. In the late 1990s, several of these Bureaus received awardsrelatingtoresearch in informationwarfare. Someanalystsbelieve this indicatestheir rolein cyberoperations. 16To augment the information warfare specialists in the 3rd and 4th GSDs, the Chinese havealso established information warfare militia units. 17 These militias can be thought of as a “cybernational guard” as they consist largely of personnel from the commercial informationtechnology (IT) and academia. Open source reporting indicates that these units have been createdfrom 2003 to 2008 in Guangzhou, Tianjin, Henan, and Ningxia provinces. There is evenevidence that some of these militia received specific wartime tasks—most of which appear tobe focused on cyber attack.The Chinese Hacker Community: From Black Hat to White HatFrom 1999 to 2004, the Chinese hacker community, thought to consist of several thousandhackers, gained notoriety for several high-profile pro-PRC attacks. These included cyber attacksagainst Indonesia, Taiwan, and the United States in response to political incidents.