Introduction to Cyber-Warfare - Proiect SEMPER FIDELIS

SUGGESTED FURTHER READING221Prior to this chapter, it was well documented that many real-world infrastructure networksare unlikely to fragment in the face of random failures. In the case of power networks, this isdue to the fact that the number of power lines connected to a given power station varieswidely in the network. However, if we consider the potential for cascading failure resultingfrom dependence on another network (i.e., the network of Internet routers), then the networkbecomes much more susceptible to random failure. To an adversary, this means that powergridnetworks highly dependent on communication infrastructure may be much easier totarget.The Buldyrev model is of great value beyond theoretical interest as in September 2003 theItalian power grid—in its communication highly dependent on the Internet—experiencedthis type of failure, resulting in power outages for large portions of the country.SUMMARYIn this chapter, we explored the potential for cyber attacks against a power grid. These attackscan be classified as component wise, protocol wise, or topology based. A basic attackmethodology for operations of this type could consist of three steps: access, discovery, andcontrol. The “Aurora Test” conducted by Idaho National Labs where a power generatorwas destroyed by way of a cyber attack is a real-world example of a component-wise attack.We also described how the topology of a power-grid network can be leveraged to enhance anattack—either by fragmenting the network or causing a cascading failure.SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGThe classification of attacks against power grids and attack methodology where introducedby Dong Wei, Yan Lu, Moshen Jafari, Paul M. Skare, and Kenneth Rohde in a paperentitled “Protecting Smart Grid Automation Systems Against Cyberattacks” published inIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.For further information on the Aurora Test and possible counter measures, we recommendthe conference paper “Myth or Reality – Does the Aurora Vulnerability Pose a Risk to MyGenerator?” written by Mark Zeller of Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories and presentedat the IEEE 64th Annual Conference for Protective Relay Engineers in 2011.For further reading on cascading power-grid failures based on topology, we recommend“Structural vulnerability of the North American power grid” by R. Albert, I. Albert, and G. L.Nakarado published in Physical Review E.References1. Gorman S. Electricity grid in U.S. penetrated by spies, Wall Street Journal April 9, 2009; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.html [accessed March 26, 2012].2. See Chapter 6.3. Wortzel LM. China’s approach to cyber operations: implications for the United States, Testimony before the Committee onForeign Affairs. House of Representatives, Hearing on “The Google Predicament: Transforming U.S. Cyberspace